Utah Law Review
Volume 2017 | Number 3

Article 2

6-2017

Find Out What It Means to Me: The Politics of
Respect and Dignity in Sexual Orientation
Antidiscrimination
Jeremiah A. Ho
University of Massachusetts School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Family Law Commons, Human Rights
Law Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons
Recommended Citation
Ho, Jeremiah A. (2017) "Find Out What It Means to Me: The Politics of Respect and Dignity in Sexual Orientation
Antidiscrimination," Utah Law Review: Vol. 2017 : No. 3 , Article 2.
Available at: http://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol2017/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Law Review by an
authorized editor of Utah Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu.

FIND OUT WHAT IT MEANS TO ME: THE POLITICS OF RESPECT
AND DIGNITY IN SEXUAL ORIENTATION ANTIDISCRIMINATION
Jeremiah A. Ho*
Abstract
This Article considers the state of LGBTQ equality after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. Specifically, by
examining this upsurge of social visibility for same-sex couples as both
acceptance of sexual minorities and cultural assimilation, the Article
finds that the marriage cases at the Supreme Court—Obergefell and
United States v. Windsor—shifted the framing of gay rights from the
politics of respect that appeared more than a decade ago in Lawrence v.
Texas toward a politics of respectability. The Article traces this
regression in Justice Kennedy’s own definition of dignity from Lawrence,
where he approached the concept of dignity as an inherent respect for
sexual identity and private choices, to his definition of dignity in the
marriage cases, where he viewed dignity in terms of respectability—as
something not inherent but earned by conforming to the norms of a
dominant culture.
To be sure, marriage equality significantly furthered the rights of
same-sex couples. Yet, in order to make larger advances for sexual
orientation antidiscrimination protections—such as explicit protections
under Title VII—the framing of gay rights must return to the politics of
respect. Marriage is problematic because the juxtaposition of same-sex
relationships against heteronormative values creates a hierarchy that
does not corroborate with the idea of inherent human worth. Hence, the
Article proposes ways to undo the respectability politics of Obergefell so
that future movements toward sexual orientation antidiscrimination can
be accomplished by latching onto the doctrinal successes of the marriage
equality movement but detaching from connotations of respectability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Often upon crucial events in social history, the intimate association between a
climactic development of an issue and representational media brings us
expressions that wed our desired norms with the descriptive truth of such matters.
In the heart-pounding seconds after the release of Obergefell v. Hodges,1 which
ushered in the reality of marriage equality across the United States, the national
imagination was suddenly swept into a rapturous state of acknowledgment that
love had won.2 Typical, would-be Friday morning posts on social media for a late
June that would have included things such as comical pet videos, selfies at the
beach, Instagram food postings, sarcastic memes, and inspirational tweets were
overshadowed by the appearance of rainbow-filtered profile pictures that
accompanied the hashtag, #LoveWins, underscoring the extent of the viral
response to the Supreme Court’s 5–4 ruling.3 Big businesses and institutions
shortly weighed in on the affair.4 Visa posted a clever banner, “Love. Accepted
everywhere.”5 Department store chain Macy’s tweeted a picture that alluded to its
bridal registry along with the tag, “From this day forward… #loveislove.”6 That
Friday evening, rainbow colors lit the White House as a presidential
acknowledgement of the judiciary’s work in Obergefell.7 Proverbially-speaking, it
seemed like everyone and their uncle was coming out to say something on the
matter rather than forever holding their peace. Figuratively, Obergefell was
probably the biggest marriage event between same-sex relationships and the law
on the national stage to date.
Together, the ruling and ensuing social media reaction conveyed that
mainstream acceptance of same-sex relationships had reversed decades of negative
public sentiments. Within the history of American law, the open pursuit of love has
been a dangerous thing for same-sex couples. In the bedroom context, consensual
1

135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Makes Same-Sex Marriage a Right
Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/supremecourt-same-sex-marriage.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4EW7-VKAZ].
3
Dawn Ennis, Victory at Supreme Court for Marriage, ADVOCATE (June 26, 2015,
9:55
AM),
http://www.advocate.com/politics/marriage-equality/2015/06/25/victorysupreme-court-marriage-equality [https://perma.cc/L97X-KRLM].
4
Patrick Kulp, The Best Reactions by Major Companies to the Historic Gay Marriage
Decision, MASHABLE (June 26, 2015), http://mashable.com/2015/06/26/brands-gaymarriage-legalized/#EiPRQpRhTEqF [https://perma.cc/KWK6-2AP2].
5
Visa, Love. Accepted Everywhere., FACEBOOK (June 26, 2015),
https://www.facebook.com/VisaUnitedStates/photos/pb.211718455520845.-2207520000.
1453988472./1171443619548319/?type=3&theater [https://perma.cc/VE2V-3BRH].
6
Macy’s
(@Macys),
TWITTER,
(June
26,
2015,
7:07
AM),
https://twitter.com/macys/status/614434775659626496 [https://perma.cc/S823-NUMA].
7
Allie Malloy & Karl de Vries, White House Shines Rainbow Colors to Hail SameSex Marriage Ruling, CNN (June 30, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/26/politics/
white-house-rainbow-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/9GF4-JS5R].
2
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sexual conduct was once criminal.8 In the marriage and family context prior to
Obergefell, the right to wed remained unrecognized by institutions, politics, and
norms that dominated mainstream ideas about sexual identity, gender, and
relationships.9 The Obergefell decision therefore underscored the recent ongoing
transition away from unpopular views of same-sex relationships.10 And for an
instant in that evening after the decision, the broadcast image of the Disney World
castle in Florida basking in rainbow lights seemed to impress upon our collective
consciousness a storybook ending for same-sex couples.11 Love, at last, was
available and no longer cabined. Love had, presumably, won.
That sentiment of storybook endings was later extended in media
representations of same-sex couples after Obergefell. Advertisements kept alive
the spirit of #LoveWins in their marketing as summer 2015 moved into the fall.
One prominent example was the Campbell’s Soup television commercial that
featured a real-life gay male couple in a humorous meal-time scene in their kitchen
with their adopted toddler son.12 Apart from incorporating the gay fathers, the ad
depicted the same scene of comfort that other Campbell’s Soup ads had done
before using opposite-sex couples and their children.13 The ad begins with a closeup of an opened can of Campbell’s Condensed Soup, resting on a kitchen counter
near a stove.14 The can bears a picture of the Star Wars character, Darth Vader, to
signify Campbell’s marketing of the next Star Wars movie.15 As we hear a man’s
voice singing the Imperial March from Star Wars, the ad cuts away from the stove
and follows the singing to show a father entertaining his son in the same kitchen
during mealtime.16 “Cooper, I am your father,” says the man, imitating Darth
Vader while playfully attempting to spoon soup past his son’s lips.17 Suddenly the
8

See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187–88 (1986), overruled by
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
9
See Molly Ball, How Gay Marriage Became a Constitutional Right: The Untold
Story of the Improbable Campaign that Finally Tipped the U.S. Supreme Court, ATLANTIC
(July 1, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/gay-marriage-supremecourt-politics-activism/397052/ [https://perma.cc/M3KG-6FNM].
10
Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (May 12, 2016),
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/07/29/graphics-slideshow-changing-attitudes-on-gaymarriage/ [https://perma.cc/2BL6-4F5A].
11
Lucas Grindley, More than a Dozen Landmarks You Won’t Believe Were Turned
Rainbow,
ADVOCATE
(June
27,
2015,
1:11
AM),
http://www.advocate.com/politics/marriage-equality/2015/06/27/more-dozen-landmarksyou-wont-believe-were-turned-rainbow [https://perma.cc/5DT6-DT7H].
12
Neuro Psyche, Your Father 30s Campbell’s #RealRealLife, YOUTUBE (Jan. 2,
2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNkCp5vjYzs
[https://perma.cc/KH7MHEMS].
13
See Jamie Gee, Campbell’s Organic Commercial - 2015, YOUTUBE (Oct. 7, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SLukHuC8Uys [https://perma.cc/7Z6Y-WK9J].
14
Neuro Psyche, supra note 12.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
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voice of another man is heard as the camera cuts to a wider shot to show that the
scene not only includes one father, but two.18 “No, no, no, I am your father,” said
the second man as he, like the first father, imitates Darth Vader while also feeding
the son a spoonful of soup.19 Then the two men look amusingly at each other while
the toddler obliviously reaches a hand into the bowl of soup in front of him.20 As
the scene fades quickly, we can hear one father say to the other, “That’s got to be
the worst Vader ever.”21 The moment is meant to invite the audience to pause
amusingly before the scene fades to the Campbell’s logo.22 A female voiceover
then announces: “Campbell’s Star Wars Soups, made for real, real life”—and thus
we are reminded that this is a Campbell’s Soup commercial after all.23 It leaves us
heartened—heartened enough for all-American Campbell’s Soup, the soup
previously advertised by Norman Rockwell illustrations,24 the soup of Andy
Warhol prints,25 the soup of iconic round-faced cartoon children used by
Campbell’s own advertisements,26 the soup endorsed by one of the largest movie
franchises of all time, Star Wars.27 By all means, as the ad suggests, same-sex
couples and their children have been ushered (or ladled) into the mainstream. They
have entered the popular media and are visible. They now eat Campbell’s Soup—
as if they had not done so before. They are branded for #RealRealLife—so real
that they had to name it twice.28
In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy based his fundamental rights ruling on a
determination that animus-fueled bans on marriage violated the dignity of samesex couples in four significant ways.29 Once Obergefell settled the question of
18

Id.
Neuro Psyche, supra note 12.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
See generally Diana Denny, Classic Ads: Wish List for a 20th Century Christmas,
SATURDAY EVENING POST (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.saturdayeveningpost.com/2012/12/
07/archives/advertisements-archives/old-christmas-ads.html
[https://perma.cc/A77CDCBY] (featuring a 1932 Christmastime advertisement for Campbell’s soup).
25
See generally Blake Gopnik, 32 Short Thoughts About Andy Warhol’s Campbell’s
Soup Can Paintings at MoMA, ARTNET NEWS (Oct. 9, 2015), https://news.artnet.com/artworld/andy-warhols-campbells-soup-can-paintings-at-moma-338874 [https://perma.cc/68
NN-3VRE] (showing photographs of Warhol’s Campbell’s Soup prints).
26
See generally Andrea Degener, Celebrate National Soup Month with Campbell’s
Soup, DOWD MOD. GRAPHIC HIST. LIBR., WASH. UNIV. ST. LOUIS (Jan. 30, 2014),
http://library.wustl.edu/celebrate-national-soup-month-with-campbells-soup/ [https://perma
.cc/P2ZH-8XXG] (showing early 20th century advertisements for Campbell’s soup).
27
Scott Mendelson, ‘Star Wars’ Is Hollywood’s Biggest, Most Enduring Original
Franchise,
FORBES
(Apr.
17,
2015,
10:00
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottmendelson/2015/04/17/star-wars-is-hollywoods-biggestoriginal-franchise/#1328901150cd [https://perma.cc/GP6C-KYC6].
28
Neuro Psyche, supra note 12.
29
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
19
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same-sex marriage, same-sex couples would, according to the intent behind
Kennedy’s opinion, be given the option that hopefully dignifies them on equal
footing with opposite-sex couples and their children. They would be free and
autonomous in matrimonial decision-making.30 They would engage in a right to an
institution dignified by society.31 They would raise children within the same social
and legal connotations of family as legally married opposite-sex couples.32 They
would partake in an institutional social order categorized by law and highly
regarded in the heart and consciousness of American society.33 In Obergefell, these
four changes normatively characterize the access to equal dignity that the
extension of marriage accorded same-sex couples.34
Curiously, the Campbell’s Soup ad could be read to parallel Kennedy’s
Obergefell goals. The scenario of the ad captures the two men after they have
chosen marriage. They are in the kitchen in a meal-time moment that symbolizes
mainstream childrearing—albeit rearing on all-American processed food. In this
way, they are no longer a gay male couple unable to marry or hindered by the law
in raising children, nor are they an unmarried, childless gay couple. Instead, the
couple is nationally depicted in a scene in which they are in their own kitchen,
feeding their child in the same playful, humorous, and dignified manner that we
would expect an ideal opposite-sex couple from a nuclear family to be doing, as
well in their fictionalized kitchen in television adland. There is certainly a sense of
dignity and normalcy being appropriated and realized in this representation. Yet,
like extending the fundamental right to marriage to same-sex couples, bestowing
that dignity to same-sex relationships creates both a hierarchical relationship
between sexual minorities and the mainstream, and a moment for the
mainstream—like the Campbell’s Soup ad—to comment on the respectability of
choices same-sex couples are making in seeking marriage.
In this way, the descriptive truth about sexual minorities does not end at a
rainbow-lit image of the Disney World castle—or at the kitchen table with a bowl
of Campbell’s Soup. The question of sexual identity and American law remains
unsettled. In the figurative dinner party that is the history of gay rights, sexual
minorities have been welcomed through the door and inside the house, served
cocktails while they nibbled on hors d’oeuvres, and seated at the dinner table,
unfolding their napkins. But they have only arrived at soup; there is still the rest of
the meal to be had. While the right to marriage extends to same-sex couples, sexual
minorities still face employment and housing discrimination.35

30

Id.
Id. at 2599–600.
32
Id. at 2600.
33
Id. at 2601.
34
Orin Kerr, What’s in the Same-Sex Marriage Ruling, WASH. POST (June 26, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/26/whats-in-thesame-sex-marriage-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/9CAJ-G69M].
35
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2625–26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
31

468

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has no direct protection of
individuals against discrimination based on sexual orientation.36 The Employment
Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) has not been passed.37 The issue of heightened
suspect classification of sexual identity slipped through Justice Kennedy’s equal
protection analysis in Obergefell and remains unresolved on the federal level in
any significant way.38 In addition, despite love winning, there was still vociferous
opposition to Obergefell. The difficulty of same-sex couples in obtaining marriage
licenses—as demonstrated by Kim Davis in Kentucky and others—illustrated
some of this lingering negativity.39 The religious and conservative outcries after
Obergefell are another.40 The refusal to provide services to same-sex couples by
small business owners further demonstrates opposition.41 The refusal by some state
legislatures to allow transgender individuals to use the bathrooms of their
identified gender also exemplifies this opposition.42 And within the Obergefell
ruling itself, four Justices penned dissents against the majority.43 Obergefell
solidified the narrative of discrimination of same-sex couples in marriage. But as
same-sex relationships get the kind of notoriety that they deserve, in what ways
was sexual orientation antidiscrimination helped by Obergefell? Love won, but did
gay win?
This Article begins with the limits of Obergefell. It has been evident that
within the last century, dignity has been used to leverage advancements against

36

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
Ed O’Keefe, Gay Rights Groups Withdraw Support of ENDA After Hobby Lobby
Decision, WASH. POST (July 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2014/07/08/gay-rights-group-withdrawing-support-of-enda-after-hobby-lobbydecision/ [https://perma.cc/2LSS-SY3Z].
38
Matthew Hoffman, Obergefell Ruling Strengthens Case for Treating Sexual
Orientation as Suspect Classification, CASETEXT (June 26, 2015), https://casetext.com/
posts/obergefell-ruling-strengthens-case-for-treating-sexual-orientation-as-suspectclassification [https://perma.cc/MEB3-MSF8].
39
John Mura & Richard Pérez-Peña, Marriage Licenses Issued in Kentucky County,
but Debates Continue, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/05/
us/kim-davis-same-sex-marriage.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3YH7-WRUW].
40
Sherif Girgis, After Obergefell: The Effects on Law, Culture, and Religion, CATH.
WORLD REP. (June 29, 2015), http://www.catholicworldreport.com/Item/3991/after_ioberg
efelli_the_effects_on_law_culture_and_religion.aspx [https://perma.cc/M4UM-99QT].
41
Rudi Keller, Hawley Seeks Exemptions for Churches, Businesses to Refuse SameSex Couples, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.columbiatribune.com/news
/politics/hawley-seeks-exemptions-for-churches-businesses-to-refuse-same-sex/article_fa7
b74e3-a24f-5bea-922c-f339eb6bd88a.html [https://perma.cc/R3KD-92NG].
42
Dave Phillips, North Carolina Bans Local Anti-Discrimination Policies, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/us/north-carolina-to-limitbathroom-use-by-birth-gender.html [https://perma.cc/2D5R-YN4S].
43
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611, 2626, 2631, 2640 (2015) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Alito, J., dissenting).
37
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human rights violations and restrictions within the law.44 Dignity has been a means
to an end; its post-Enlightenment, fundamental universality supplanted previous
versions of humanity and has been regarded as a normative individual
entitlement.45 Even before Obergefell, the anti-gay rhetoric that stole dignity away
from sexual minorities for decades was a way in which the denial of their civil
rights was justifiable under the law. Challenges fought in court and state
legislatures over gay rights were lost by gay litigants and gay rights advocates
partly because the dominant rhetoric against sexual minorities was couched within
the politics that disrespected them46—that, for instance, gays were living in a
lifestyle premised on a morally blameworthy choice or pathology and that they
practiced sexually deviant, perverse acts.47
For the most part, we have moved further away from a politics of disrespect
toward recognizing that dignity exists in sexual preferences.48 So a good question
to ask in the new shadow of Obergefell is whether the dignity recognized by the
Court specifically accorded sexual minorities the respect that they should be
entitled to for being who they are, or whether the dignity rhetoric in Obergefell
stopped short of this view and settled for addressing the respectability of same-sex
couples’ choices for wanting to participate in marriage. Obergefell was an opinion
about dignity as respectability.49 So how does it impact the way in which sexual
minorities move further to resolve questions of sexual identity and the law, if
“further” means antidiscrimination?
This leap from respectability to respect is this Article’s inquiry. If we are to
further antidiscrimination protections on the basis of sexual orientation at the
federal level, then we must arrive at a situation where dignity under the law is the
acknowledgment of respect for sexual identities, not their respectability. As the
lyrics sung so famously by Aretha Franklin in a song known for its symbolic
impact on 1960s’ gender equality, particularly for its “appeal for dignity,” suggests
respect is an important human regard that is often withheld: “All I’m askin’ / Is for

44

ERIN DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE WORTH OF THE
HUMAN PERSON 1 (2012).
45
See id. at 2–3.
46
See, e.g., MARTHA CRAVEN NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 77–85 (2010) (observing that Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), exemplified how “[y]ears of stigmatization of gays and
lesbians made it all too easy for judges . . . to talk about them as a class of moral pariahs
who are not like other humans”).
47
Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay
Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 835 (2014).
48
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The petitioners are entitled to
respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their
destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”).
49
Yuvraj Joshi, The Respectable Dignity of Obergefell v. Hodges, 6 CAL. L. REV.
117, 117 (2015).
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a little respect when you come home.”50 Beyond this introduction in Part I, Part II
of this Article will discuss the impact of respectability in gay rights advocacy and
observe dignity defined by respect politics as a normative goal. Part III will then
explore how the discussion about dignity in the context of gay rights at the Court
was also simultaneously a journey from the politics of disrespect to currently the
politics of respectability. And Part IV will theorize how the narrative of sexual
orientation antidiscrimination can proceed from dignity as respectability to dignity
as respect, before Part V’s conclusion.
As we progress (hopefully) toward antidiscrimination for sexual minorities,
respect is the more desirable route to take when using dignity to elevate the status
of sexual minorities to a protected class—whether judicially or legislatively.
Dignity as respect reframes the discussion away from choices and existence in a
way that deprives the dominant culture opportunities to comment, and instead,
places the subgroup in a light where such type of judgment is off the table.
II. DIGNITY AS RESPECT
Part II of this Article will trace the usage and meaning of dignity in several
key political and historical movements, culminating with the advancement of
sexual minority rights domestically. First, subpart A will examine the dual
meaning of dignity as I chart its influence on human rights discourse. Second,
subpart B will then illustrate dignity’s influence on antidiscrimination movements
in the United States, particularly in the context of race. Finally, subpart C will
locate the use of the concept of dignity in the LGBTQ movement in the United
States.
A. Dignity in Human Rights Discourse
Although no consistency exists within the vast usage and interpretations of
human dignity by political institutions and courts internationally, a generalized
accord does exist in tracing the history of dignity’s import into the modern legal
and political sphere.51 Current political incarnations of dignity took shape postWorld War II in human rights discourse, in which dignity was a currency of value
because its relationship to intrinsic humanity and worth addressed the inhumane
atrocities of Nazi Germany.52 The use of dignity to preserve human rights
prompted examples of post-war declarations recognizing and urging the protection

50

ARETHA FRANKLIN, Respect, on I NEVER LOVED A MAN THE WAY I LOVE YOU
(Atlantic Records Studio 1967); see also MARK RIBOWSKY, DREAMS TO REMEMBER: OTIS
REDDING, STAX RECORDS, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTHERN SOUL XIII-XV
(2015) (quoting Rolling Stones interview with Jerry Wexler, producer of Aretha Franklin’s
recording of “Respect,” on the song’s significance).
51
DALY, supra note 44, at 5.
52
Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human
Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 662–63 (2008).
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of dignity as, in some ways, a right to humanity in various contexts53—despite
much debate over the definite and tangible contours of that right.54 With drafting
influence from Jacques Maritian, the prominent French Catholic philosopher, the
United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights both
placed human dignity at the forefront with proclamations that mentioned “the
dignity and worth of the human person”55 and “recognition of the inherent
dignity . . . of all members of the human family” in their texts, respectively.56
This acknowledgment of the import of human dignity functions as the
underlying cohesive force or value for the idealized furtherance of human rights
efforts stated in the aforementioned Universal Declaration.57 Other international
documents ensued, including, by example, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which provides in Article 10 that “[a]ll persons deprived of their
liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of
the human person.”58 The 1977 additions to Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, dealing with captivity of noncombatants and combatants
who are prisoners of war, similarly uphold human dignity during armed conflict by
dictating that those held captive “shall in all circumstances be treated humanely.”59
The additions also explicitly prohibited “outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.”60
Of course, the concept of human dignity itself predates modernity. Scholarly
work in legal and political philosophy on human dignity often cite to examples in
antiquity. Both Christopher McCrudden and Rex Glensy in their respective studies
on the subject trace dignity to at least to the classical Roman period where dignity
had two meanings—first, as an idea of honor and respect accorded to one holding a
particular status (“dignitas homini”); and secondly, as an idea, attributed to Cicero,
of dignity as an inherent quality based on human existence (“dignitas”).61 The
survival and evolution of the concept of human dignity through the ages is beyond
this Article’s inquiry—but needless to say, human dignity was not an idea about
53

Id. at 670–71.
Id. at 673–75.
55
U.N. Charter pmbl.
56
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
57
See Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 73
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153, 1172 (1998) (“Dignity enjoys pride of place in the
Declaration: it is affirmed ahead of rights at the very beginning of the Preamble; it is
accorded priority again in Article 1; and it is woven into the text at three other key points,
connecting the Declaration to the Charter in the fifth clause of the Preamble, introducing
the social and economic rights in the ‘chapeau’ (Article 22), and in Article 23’s reference
to ‘an existence worthy of human dignity.’”).
58
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 10, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
59
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
60
Id.
61
McCrudden, supra note 52, at 656–57; Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 73 (2011).
54
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human existence that was conceived in the mid-20th century but rather developed
throughout periods of Western thought.62 The two competing ideas of dignity—one
that would embrace status and hierarchy and another that would embrace intrinsic
universal worth—would play out their dominance and prevalence over the
centuries. We see this today in plain-meaning word studies when scholars run the
word “dignity” through dictionaries and come up with both meanings.63
But as exhibited from the international documents above, the concept of
dignity as respect for intrinsic worth or inherent humanity seems to have prevailed
in modern political and legal frameworks. Nobility connotations of the dignity of
antiquity, as well as the later medieval and pre-modern religious definition of
dignity that placed the Divine as the source of intrinsic human worth, are both
constrained in the modern political concepts of dignity.64 Now devoid of its
religious and feudal connotations, dignity is no longer a condition or status that is
earned through rank or transformation, but rather, an inherent secular quality as a
result of existing that translates into entitlements recognized by political
institutions. Immanuel Kant, who is often credited with laying the modern
foundation to conceptualize dignity, advocated dignity as respect for inherent
worth from a more objective posture, putting aside religious or noble influences.65
Kant’s categorical imperative demonstrates that: “Humanity itself is a dignity;
for a human being cannot be used merely as a means by any human being (either
by others or even by himself) but must always be used at the same time as an
end.”66 Beneath Kant’s surface proclamation that one should not treat people as
means but rather as ends, implications arise. Tethered to the intrinsic worth in
every human being is the notion that “dignity is grounded in a concept of
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Luís Roberto Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: Human Dignity in
Contemporary Law and in the Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
331, 334 (2012).
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See Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 795, 823 n.145 (2001) (finding that the word “dignity” in Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary of the English Language possessed a primary definition of
dignity as “intrinsic worth” and secondary meaning as “degree of esteem”); see also
Stephen J. Wermiel, Law and Human Dignity: The Judicial Soul of Justice Brennan, 7
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 223, 224 (1998) (finding that the American Heritage dictionary
contain both definitions of dignity as “self-respect” and “nobility”).
64
Glensy, supra note 61, at 74.
65
Christopher A. Bracey, Dignity in Race Jurisprudence, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 669,
678 (2005) (“In Western philosophy, one might trace the roots of fuller, more modern
understandings of dignity to Immanuel Kant. For Kant, dignity was simply another way of
referring to a person’s worth. A person’s worth was understood as something independent
of a person’s value or utility. Worth, according to Kant, did not rest upon virtuous conduct
or morally decent behavior. Rather, worth was understood to refer to the capacity that each
of us presumptively possesses for such conduct or behavior. Individuals may vary in their
value or utility under different circumstances, but persons presumably do not vary in their
dignity or worth.” (citations omitted)).
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IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 209 (Mary J. Gregor ed. &
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797).
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autonomy that holds at its core a valued moral center that is equal for everyone
(men and women).”67 Undoubtedly, variation in opinion exists in scholarly
explication and interpretation regarding Kant’s vision of dignity.68 However,
“whether rightly or wrongly, the conception of dignity most closely associated
with Kant is the idea of dignity as autonomy; that is, the idea that to treat people
with dignity is to treat them as autonomous individuals able to choose their
destiny.”69 Derived from this philosophy, “[t]he legal application of Kantian
thought is to use, as a baseline, the notion that individuals should always be
protected from any instrumentalization by the state.”70
From here, the distance seems short between the Kantian concept of dignity
with its universalist regard for a person’s inherent humanity and any politically
egalitarian approaches to individual rights; indeed, Kant’s idea of dignity has
contributed to the development of equality in Western thought.71 The bridge
between Kantian dignity and egalitarianism is accomplished through the derivative
relationship between human dignity and individual autonomy as its proxy. As
Jeremy Rabkin has observed,
Kant certainly linked “human dignity” with equality. He grounded the
claim of human dignity in human free will, in the capacity for moral
choice. According to Kant this capacity is the same, in principle, in the
most degraded and the most exalted of human beings. Kant made the
claim to “autonomy” a central aspect of human dignity—the notion that
each person makes his own moral law for his own life.72
A close relationship between a Kantian dignity and equality is plausible because
between the two original core definitions of dignity—either dignitas hominis or
dignitas—and their respective derivations, Kant’s concept of dignity embraces the
latter (dignitas) by justifying an egalitarian approach to humanity over a
hierarchical one.
Dignitas, the egalitarian approach, was imported into the post-World War II
era with acknowledgements of equal rights based on regard for human dignity
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Glensy, supra note 61, at 76.
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Id. at 659–60.
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Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, The Search for Equality: A Human Rights Issue, 25
QUEEN’S L.J. 401, 405 (2000) (“John Stuart Mill and, later, Immanuel Kant and Simone de
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through the intrinsic worth of individual existence.73 In particular, the proclivities
of Kantian and neo-Kantian concepts of dignity for animating notions of equality
within the modern era makes adopting human dignity attractive—and almost
necessary—in human rights discourse.74 Henceforth, it is no wonder that dignity
appears frequently in modern human rights documents internationally.
B. Dignity and Antidiscrimination in American Jurisprudence
Kant’s influence in American political conceptions of dignity is somewhat
qualified by the appearance and usage of the word “dignity” by some of the
founding personalities of the early United States. Rex Glensy notes that Thomas
Paine’s use of the concept of “natural dignity of man,” which stressed inherent
worth consistently with Kant’s version of dignity, hearkened to individual rights
protection that countered the British definition “where dignity had more of an
ancient Roman connotation and was reserved for the nobility or aristocracy.”75
Glensy also notes that Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton shared Paine’s
view.76 Yet, the definition of dignity as respect for inherent humanity faced
competing tension with the meaning of dignity as status or rank, not merely with
British oppressors, but also domestically within the founding philosophy of the
new American republic.
The competition between the two meanings of dignity reverberated
throughout The Federalist Papers. As Glensy observes, the idea of dignity “seems
initially to have a central position” in The Federalist Papers but “[f]ollowing this
Kantian usage of the term, the concept of dignity in [the papers] then morphs into
the ancient Roman connotation.”77 Eventually, “dignity as an inherent quality of
individuals was lost to a view of dignity as an attribute acquired as a result of
holding an official position.”78 Of course, the other marked feature in regards to
American political precepts and the use of dignity is the lack of the invocation of
“dignity” in most of the founding documents.
Other than its wavering usage in The Federalist Papers, the word “dignity”
itself is not found in the U.S. Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, or the
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See John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 539,
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Bill of Rights.79 In searching for dignitary rights within our founding texts, the
word play of course can become a tug-of-war between textual exegetes and more
hermeneutical readers.80 For now, it seems as if the hermeneutical readers have
won and that curious lack of “dignity” in our founding documents has not proved
fatal to dignity’s conceptualization, presence, and influence within American law.
Perhaps in the United States, what we have is merely a case where we adhere to
invoking the spirit of dignity rather than its letter—and indeed, this seems to have
occurred in the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution at least.
For instance, absent positive declarations of dignity rights in governing legal
texts in the United States, the concept that individuals possess human dignity is
often established within the sphere of negative rights—in the adjudication of state
interference with freedoms that are not only fundamental under due process
theories but are also considered proxies that externalize human dignity.81 Here,
dignity’s emergence likely reflects the synergies of individual rights theory and
American libertarian leanings. The United States’ approach to dignity has been
observed as “more individualistic” than communitarian approaches, such as those
in Germany where “dignity” is a pronounced right under its constitution and
embodies a definition of respect for self-worth concurrently located within the
community.82 Dignity is alive and present in American jurisprudence.
Undeniably, dignity is a word found within American constitutional parlance
because “at least as dignity pertains to the Constitution, the Supreme Court has,
albeit scantily, developed certain narratives based on human dignity as it pertains
to certain constitutional rights.”83 Maxine Goodman has traced the Supreme
Court’s usage into eight narratives (or categories) spanning across amendments
that touch upon individual rights.84 Of the eight narratives, two involve Fourteenth
Amendment due process or equal protection theories where dignity has helped
address minority discrimination based on hierarchical differentiations.
First, one of the identified narratives where the presence of dignity interests
appears is within the negative rights privacy cases, in which dignity is the
underlying reason for allowing individuals to have autonomy in personal choices
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Dietmar von der Pfordten, On the Foundations of the Rule of Law and the Principle
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that affect self-identity in some way (individuality and personhood).85 In Part III,
infra, we will see this narrative line lead to the decriminalizing of consensual
same-sex sodomy in Lawrence v. Texas.86 The equal protection narrative involves
education and accommodation cases where dignity interests of litigants helped the
Court address racial discrimination in Brown v. Board of Education,87 and racial
and gender discrimination in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S.88 and Roberts v.
U.S. Jaycees.89 In these cases, Goodman notes that dignity interests seem to strike
at inherent worth and humanity. Indeed, in handling cases that involve human
dignity interests, the Court appears generally to side with Kant:
[I]t is the Kantian vision of dignity that seemingly animates those
Justices who find that certain constitutional clauses incorporate the
concept of human dignity. . . . [I]t is a person’s inherent autonomy,
integrity, and right to be respected by the government that motivates
references to dignity by the Supreme Court.90
Thus, with cases involving discrimination, the invocation of dignity at the Supreme
Court—which applies a more Kantian approach toward dignity—has been an
important part of addressing minority equality rights and overcoming hierarchical
exclusion.
Broadly speaking, the idea of respect in dignity has been carved out and then
manifested as an equal recognition of human existence in all individuals and the
rights that attach to existence. In the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process cases Goodman mentions, the Court’s regard for autonomy in privacy
seems to suggest recognition of the existence of rights because autonomy reflects
personhood. So long as personhood serves as an agent of that humanity, this is
consistent with philosophies of dignity that stress that dignity requires some sort of
respect of inherent humanity. Likewise, in the equal protection cases that
Goodman observes, the Court’s analysis in segregation and discrimination cases
goes to the stigma and injury that such acts inflict on individuals based on aspects
of the inherent humanity, which the Court sees in their racial and gender
identities.91 From a negative rights perspective in U.S. constitutional law—because
of the respect for the dignity of individuals—such equal recognition either in
existence (i.e. identity) or fundamental rights that derive from personal autonomy
should not be taken away or abridged without a methodical calculation or concern.
This is the framework within equality jurisprudence and due process. On larger
cosmic levels of politics, this is the framework against wholesale tyranny. Thus,
85
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respect for inherent humanity is a constitutional virtue and an aspect within human
dignity that normatively ought to be preserved.
C. Dignity in LGBTQ Rights Advancement in the United States
Without explicit antidiscrimination protections, such as enumeration under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 or a heightened scrutiny classification under equal
protection analysis, sexual minorities have had to rely on the Supreme Court to
rectify their violated dignity and protect them from marginalization. By no means
has dignity been the only strategy of success. With some slight subtextual allusions
to dignity, Romer v. Evans92 relied mostly on the presence of majoritarian animus
behind the voter passage of a state referendum in Colorado that would have singled
out sexual minorities.93 The Supreme Court’s explicit use of dignity to address
discrimination based on sexual orientation was first witnessed in Lawrence, where
Justice Kennedy crafted a ruling that mentioned the dignity of consensual samesex partners in order to overturn prior precedent condoning anti-sodomy statutes in
Bowers v. Hardwick.94
Through the privacy interests in the reproductive rights cases, the Court
exhibited its regard for individual autonomy as central to dignity and extended
those privacy rights to also include consensual same-sex intimacy.95 From there,
the Court noted how sexual conduct had autonomy implications that tied itself—
similarly to privacy cases—to the respect for personhood and human worth
requisite for the function of dignity overall. By consequence, privacy was extended
from reproductive rights to sexual conduct in Lawrence in order to decriminalize
consensual same-sex sodomy.96 This result was significant as Lawrence served as a
moment in which “the Court advanc[ed] human dignity as part of affording
liberty”97 and invariably “mark[ed] a more substantial shift” in the use of dignity in
privacy cases.98
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517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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disability on a single named group, an exceptional and, as we shall explain, invalid form of
legislation. Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that
the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it
lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”).
94
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“It suffices for us to acknowledge
that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and
their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one
element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution
allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.”); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
95
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–68.
96
Id. at 574.
97
Goodman, supra note 84, at 762.
98
Id.
93

478

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

Some have argued that at the broader reaches of Lawrence, the case was about
more than consensual same-sex intimacy. Specifically, some have alleged that the
sexual acts of willing same-sex partners served as a proxy for sexual orientation
and identity in Lawrence because the choices made in consensual same-sex
intimacy revealed sexual preferences:
The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from
each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual
lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The
State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making
their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct
without intervention of the government. “It is a promise of the
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter.” The Texas statute furthers no legitimate
state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private
life of the individual.99
In some ways, as Glensy points out, dignity in Lawrence served as a heuristic for
something else:
Under the proxy approach to the right to dignity, the invocation of a
dignitary interest in a particular circumstance does not signify something
independent of another enumerated right, but rather acts as a proxy for
that right (be that right related to a liberty or an equality interest for
example).100
As he notes in this vein with Lawrence, “the Court held ‘that adults may choose to
enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private
99

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
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lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.’”101 Post-Lawrence, some
scholarly inquiry addressing Kennedy’s use of dignity and connecting that use to a
possible insinuation of the immutability of sexual identity have also buttressed the
notion that dignity can act as a channeling function for the Court to solve a
problem that has no straightforward doctrinal fix by becoming the placeholder for
sexual identity.102
If dignity encompasses respect for inherent humanity, sexual identity would
seemingly fit within Kantian notions of autonomy and personhood. This inherent
humanity—and by extension, dignity—could conceivably serve as the placeholder
for inherent or innate sexual identity (whether biological or constructive) before a
real judicial discussion of it is ripe while making it also possible for a subtle and
favorable reading of immutability to exist in the subtext of Kennedy’s opinion. In
this way, dignity, according to Glensy’s reading of Lawrence, bridged the gap in
the conversation between sexual identity and sexual conduct: “Such coupling of
privacy and dignity within the context of liberty strongly suggests if not an identity
between the two, then at least a very strong correlation that is sufficiently bonded
to discourage separate discussion of the two.”103 And all of these transitive
properties and connections made through dignity justify Lawrence because the
Court could not have relied readily on any doctrine that would have protected
against discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Court had to resort to
something else: dignity.
Interpreting Lawrence’s conception of dignity, Kenji Yoshino has identified
the origins of an “anti-humiliation principle” in gay rights.104 This attachment of
dignity to the context of gay rights is significant for sexual minority litigants and
conducive to countering social sentiments regarding sexual minorities from what
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Yoshino calls, “a politics of shame.”105 Dignity facilitates litigation, as well as
doctrinal development. At least in Lawrence, it helped recognize the autonomy in
conduct that could possibly express sexual identity but also the inherent humanity
of that sexual identity. After Lawrence, the potency of dignity has served gay
rights well. Beyond the decriminalization of consensual sex acts of same-sex
partners, dignity interests were noted in the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,”106 in
the overturning of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) in U.S. v. Windsor,107
and finally with marriage equality in Obergefell v. Hodges.108 That antihumiliation principle seems to have immense utility. In addition, the use of dignity
in the Supreme Court’s gay rights opinions has been consistent in keeping with
ideas of inherent human worth that justifies—by proxy—anti-discriminatory ends.
By invoking ideas of autonomy and personhood, Lawrence, Windsor, and
Obergefell all tried to tap into that association in varying degrees. Sexual
orientation would invariably be linked to that personhood and thus respect for
minority sexual orientations would fulfill dignity interests.
But because dignity lacks a positivist incantation in American law and is
defined and shaped predominately in negative rights, an amorphous wavering
noticeably exists in its meaning. Sometimes that seemingly age-old tension
105
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between respect and rank continues to play out in constitutional cases and the
Court’s recent pro-gay rights opinions exhibit this competition. However, in the
case of defining dignity by rank or nobility status—in which dignity is earned and
accorded—dignity by rank or nobility has been replaced with evaluations of the
social respectability of sexual minorities that, upon a favorable appraisal, confer
dignity and lead to recognition of relationships (such as in Windsor) or to the
extension of the right to marry (Obergefell).
For sexual minorities, a subgroup that has been steeped within the politics of
marginalization, the significance of attaining respect within the collective social
terrain cannot be overstated. Respect could be cultivated in many things from the
significant to the mundane—e.g. personal choices, images, lifestyles, tastes, what
to post on social media, what wine to drink on a Friday night—that could
consequently place sexual minorities in the realm beyond historical reproach,
judgment, and bias to somewhere closer to social acceptance. Respect would also
ideally recognize, in the neo-Kantian sense, the inherent attribute that distinguishes
sexual minorities—i.e. their distinct sexual preference—and view that attribute and
its expression not as an aberration but as a welcomed and contributing part of
pluralism, and by extension, human existence.
The question, however, is whether that respect is an entitlement of the type
reflected by the meaning of dignity as respect, or whether it must be negotiated and
then earned, which is more like dignity through rank or nobility. This debate has
not been a recent one in gay rights, nor has it been exclusively within sexuality
rights discourse.109 The rise and use of dignity in the advancement of gay rights
and possibly toward future advances in sexual orientation antidiscrimination
efforts warrants a continuing discussion.
In the post-Obergefell world, where one of the next steps for gay rights
advancement is antidiscrimination, respect for inherent humanity would seem to
comport with that goal. In this way, dignity rights must continue to further gay
rights and antidiscrimination, serving as the channeling device or the heuristic, but
also the agent that facilitates respect for minority sexual orientations and identities.
Here is where that tension between dignity as respect and dignity as respectability
becomes an issue. Although Lawrence ultimately bolstered respect for autonomy
and personhood in its definition of dignity, even there the opinion exhibited a bit of
ambiguity in its approach to consensual same-sex intimacy. Yuvraj Joshi, in his
careful study of respectability and dignity in Obergefell, has noted that Lawrence
109
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tended “to affirm dignity as respect for freedom to make personal choices,”110 but
Kennedy’s opinion also “did convey a measure of respectability: Justice Kennedy
depicted sexual conduct as ‘but one element of personal bond that is more
enduring,’ even though John Lawrence and Tyron Garner, who were convicted
under the impugned Texas statute, were not known to be in a relationship.”111 Part
III of this Article will demonstrate further how Windsor and Obergefell were cases
in which Lawrence’s original idea of dignity as respect was subsequently
augmented by a politics of respectability that has brought both meanings of dignity
within the advancement of gay rights.
Respectability politics have a negotiating function not just in the realm of
minority rights discourse, but also in furthering acceptance of a marginalized group
into the mainstream. Our paths to dignity can be influenced, for better or worse, by
the ways different subgroups achieve social recognition in a body politic. In the
evolving visibility and acceptance of sexual minorities, the historical negotiation
for gays has been described as a conversation that tries to subvert marginalization
by playing into respectable standards held by the dominant perspective:
Assimilation in the gay/lesbian community is based on models of
respectability and upward class mobility that are heterosexually defined.
Heterosexuals control the culture because the more different a
gay/lesbian is to the heterosexual culture, the less likely it is that s/he will
be hired to work in the highest paying jobs in our society.112
To this end, “[g]ays and lesbians who ‘pass’ have been able to break through these
barriers, however, usually the price is costly: ‘staying in the closet.’”113
Through respectability, the whole negotiation assures and legitimizes
hierarchy, and demonstrates that the subgroup individual trying to gain access
starts at the position of the outsider.114 Rather than demanding respect for their
inherent dignity, there is pressure to exhibit respectability in order acquire dignity
from a dominant group.115 Granted, within the framework of respectability politics,
dignity is earned through subjugation. The politics of respectability might be
110
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pragmatic but members of subgroups compromise inherent dignity either
advertently or inadvertently in order to “trade up” for social tolerance and then
acceptance by a dominant group. This is not to say that all minority individuals do
this involuntarily. But where pressure exists to gain respectability, the ideals of a
leveled democratic playing field are thwarted by the persistence of dominant
politics and hierarchy. It is a fix in the short run for obtaining social acceptance,
but it may inhibit efforts toward formal equality in the long run.
The literature on race has ample examples regarding the competing politics of
respect and respectability in order to achieve racial equality and acceptance.
Observations and ideas about respectability in African-American negotiations
against racial bias stem all the way back to slavery, for example, by examining the
caricature of Uncle Tom associated with the stereotypes of conformity. W. E. B.
Du Bois hinted at this negotiation by articulating a conflicted duality or “double
consciousness” that was often present in the identities and existence of educated
African-Americans in the early 20th century: “One ever feels his twoness,–an
American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two
warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being
torn asunder.”116 As DuBois noted, the duality permeates the negotiation of
African Americans: “The history of the American Negro is the history of this
strife – this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into
a better and truer self.”117 All of this tension is traced to a desire to obtain worth—
“to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American without being
cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without having the doors of opportunity
closed roughly in his face.”118
Historian Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham specifically coined the term “politics
of respectability” to describe this identity negotiation in African-American
churchwomen in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.119 By analogy, the concept
could be observed in colonial and post-colonial discourse.120 Hence, this is not just
116

W. E. B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 3 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (1903).
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EVELYN BROOKS HIGGINBOTHAM, RIGHTEOUS DISCONTENT: THE WOMEN’S
MOVEMENT IN THE BLACK BAPTIST CHURCH, 1880–1920 at 185–229 (1993).
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See, e.g., ROBERT ROSS, STATUS AND RESPECTABILITY IN THE CAPE COLONY,
1750–1870: A TRAGEDY OF MANNERS 70–94 (1999); see also Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,
Can the Subaltern Speak?, in THE POST-COLONIAL STUDIES READER 28 (Bill Ashcroft et
al. eds., 1995); Stacy-Ann Elvy, A Postcolonial Theory of Spousal Rape: The Caribbean
and Beyond, 22 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 89, 102–03 (2015) (discussing the concept of subalterneity in post-colonial studies as referring to “the various hierarchies which existed
within the colonized world -- that is, within the ‘native’ population” that have allowed
British patriarchy, “which was grounded in notions of respectability and domesticity,” to
dominate “subaltern sexed subject, or brown woman” (citations omitted)); Alpana Roy,
Postcolonial Theory and Law: A Critical Introduction, 29 ADEL. L. REV. 315, 345 (2008);
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an American domestic phenomenon. But in the U.S. racial context, the discussion
over a subgroup’s own cultural negotiations to obtain social acceptance has
survived into the post-Civil Rights era dialogue about African-American racial
identity—into the presidency of Barack Obama, for instance;121 in the heated
debates over the efficacious endorsements of respectability by Randall Kennedy;122
and race relations discourse related to the #Black Lives Matter movement.123
Issues over respectability do not pertain only to African-American racial discourse
because “to the extent that social acceptability and respectability is equated with
whiteness, issues of cultural assimilation are issues of ‘race.’”124
Thus, such issues rear themselves in discourse about other racial subgroups in
the United States. For instance, in studies on Asian-American experiences with
race, the ideas of cultural assimilation and “model minority” citizenship have
classically demonstrated the emergence of respectability politics. There is a duality
as well in the experience of Asian-American identities negotiating for social
acceptance by using respectability. As Natsu Taylor Saito puts it, the “model
minority” is a label that “reflects its intent to both subordinate and manipulate.
Asians are a ‘minority’—i.e., not settlers—and thus to be relegated to a
subordinate status within settler society. Simultaneously, however, we are the
‘model,’ presumably for other ‘minorities.’”125 Saito’s observation echoes W. E. B.
Du Bois’ duality description. But as the label “evokes the imagery of Asians as

Natsu Taylor Saito, Tales of Color and Colonialism: Racial Realism and Settler Colonial
Theory, 10 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 1, 60–61 (2014) (“The racialization of migrant Others
is a strategy that has been used to subordinate peoples of color in a way that erases their
particular histories and identities, replacing them with artificially constructed identities that
are then used to reinforce a multi-layered racial hierarchy. Just as Indigenous peoples from
hundreds of nations in North America or Africa have been categorized, officially and in
public perception, as simply ‘American Indian’ or ‘Black,’ those of Chinese, Vietnamese,
Korean or Filipino ancestry are all ‘Asians,’ while those from origins as diverse as Mexico,
Puerto Rico, and Argentina are ‘Hispanic.’ In recent decades, the classification system has
become somewhat more complex but no more accurate.”).
121
See, e.g., FREDRICK C. HARRIS, THE PRICE OF THE TICKET: BARACK OBAMA AND
RISE AND DECLINE OF BLACK POLITICS 4–5 (2012).
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See, e.g., David A. Graham, What Randall Kennedy Misses About Respectability
Politics and Black Lives Matter, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com
/notes/2015/10/what-randall-kennedy-misses-about-respectability-politics-and-black-livesmatter/407101/ [https://perma.cc/R4AU-FWHL].
123
See, e.g., Shannon M. Houston, Respectability Will Not Save Us: Black Lives
Matter Is Right to Reject the “Dignity and Decorum” Mandate Handed Down to Us from
Slavery, SALON (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.salon.com/2015/08/25/respectability_will_not
_save_us_black_lives_matter_is_right_to_reject_the_dignity_and_decorum_mandate_hand
ed_down_to_us_from_slavery/ [https://perma.cc/WT2U-MZMT].
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Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby—LatCrit
Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1627 (1997), reprinted in 10
LA RAZA L.J. 499 (1998).
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Saito, supra note 120, at 62.
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hardworking, economically successful, and anxious to assimilate,”126 it also
“masks the distinct problems faced by particular subgroups,”127 and “sends the notso-subtle message to Asian Americans that we should be ‘grateful’ not to be at the
bottom of settler racial hierarchy, reinforcing settler hegemony by creating barriers
to our ability to see common patterns of subordination.”128
On sexual orientation and the law, legal scholarship has identified and
explored respectability politics—most often either in describing its effects or the
contextualized ways in which sexual minorities obtain social and legal
acceptance.129 Much has been said critically about the integration, visibility, and
acceptance of sexual minorities. One of the most vivid historical accounts of this
debate in gay rights was the famous exchange of articles between Paula Ettelbrick
and Tom Stoddard in the Fall 1989 issue of Out/Look magazine over the potential
pros and cons of pursuing recognition of same-sex marriages.130 Ettelbrick opposed
the strategy for gaining equality through same-sex marriage while Stoddard was
more responsive and hopeful to the idea.131
But both attorneys recognized the transformative properties of marriage in
terms of its respectability. Ettelbrick noted:
The growing discussion about the right to marry may be explained in part
by this need for acceptance. Those closer to the norm or to power in this
country are more likely to see marriage as a principle of freedom and
equality. Those who are more acceptable to the mainstream because of
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Id.
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1569 (2006); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Sexual Politics and Social Change, 41 CONN. L.
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Equality and Justice for Lesbian and Gay Families and Relationships, 61 RUTGERS L. REV.
529, 553 (2009); Mariana Valverde, A New Entity in the History of Sexuality: The
Respectable Same-Sex Couple, 32 FEMINIST STUD. 155, 156 (2006); Kenji Yoshino,
Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772 (2002).
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See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Gay Marriage: A Must or a Bust?: Since When Was
Marriage the Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, at 8, 9, 14–17; Thomas B.
Stoddard, Gay Marriage: A Must or a Bust?: Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to
Marry, OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, at 8, 8–13.
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Ettelbrick emphatically stated that “[u]ntil the constitution is interpreted to respect
and encourage differences, pursuing the legalization of same-sex marriage would be
leading our movement into a trap.” Ettelbrick, supra note 130, at 16. Meanwhile, Stoddard
believed that “[t]he movement for equality for lesbians and gay men can only be enriched
through this collective exploration of the question of marriage.” Stoddard, supra note 130,
at 13.
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race, gender, and economic status are more likely to want the right to
marry. It is the final acceptance, the ultimate affirmation of identity.132
Stoddard offered a similar take:
Given the imprimatur of social and personal approval which
marriage provides, it is not surprising that some lesbians and gay men
among us would look to legal marriage for self-affirmation. After all,
those who marry can be instantaneously transformed from “outsiders” to
“insiders,” and we have a desperate need to become insiders.133
Ettelbrick ultimately urged a politics of respect as the norm: “Justice for gay men
and lesbians will be achieved only when we are accepted and supported in this
society despite our differences from the dominant culture and the choices we make
regarding our relationships.”134 Meanwhile, Stoddard had hopes to overcome
respectability, perhaps in order to get to respect: “[M]arriage may be unattractive
and even oppressive as it is currently structured and practiced, but enlarging the
concept to embrace same-sex couples would necessarily transform it into
something new.”135
The Ettelbrick/Stoddard discussion is relevant in Obergefell’s wake. It
reminds us of the progress in the marriage equality movement, hopefully in part
precipitated by the increased social visibility of sexual minorities and hopefully
precipitating, in part, to more protection further down the line. Conversely, the
Ettelbrick/Stoddard debate helps verify whether the gay rights movement since
1989 has also succumbed to the politics of respectability instead of a more
wholeheartedly staunch entrenchment in the politics of respect. After all, both of
them assumed that marriage has been a traditionally heteronormative institution.136
And the studies in gay assimilation or respectability have revealed that the
dominant norms that end up controlling identity negotiations with respectability
are those values directly reflecting a white, heteronormative, middle-class, and
suburban demographic.137
Incidentally, this tension between respectability and respect plays out in the
ways one could interpret the Campbell’s Soup commercial discussed earlier. On
the one hand, the image of the two fathers with their adopted son is a celebration of
gay visibility—one that, of course, also affixes a sense of progressiveness to the
Campbell’s brand identity. On the other hand, there is a slippery slope in which it
could also be a moment where a national chain is conferring worth and approval of
gay relationships. Both interpretations feed into the grand logic, which is this: if
132
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respectability is more about choices one makes to be viewed with dignity by
adhering to dominant social norms, then dignity is less about inherent humanity of
an individual and more about the negotiations one has to take to become
“dignified.” Respectability subverts intrinsic dignity and equal recognition,
perpetuating the notion that dignity is not inherent but must be earned from a
dominant group. This notion inhibits equality because it creates and sustains
hierarchy. It would not—according to most views—be a normative goal for
defining a framework for human dignity in the law.
Since the vagueness of dignity—or differences in interpretations regarding
dignity—can obfuscate or deny the path to true intrinsic worth and value of human
existence that effectuates equality and liberty, it is no wonder how easily we lose
sight of respect in place of respectability. But a politics of respect preserves
inherent humanity and appeals to senses of formal equality. Henceforth, in moving
beyond marriage equality toward sexual orientation antidiscrimination, dignity as
respect for the sexual identity of individuals should be stressed, rather than dignity
as respectability of choices that might represent sexuality. In this way, sexual
identity or orientation serves as the proxy for inherent humanity. Two reasons
underlay this preference.
First, respect is about recognizing intrinsic qualities that reflect human
existence, including sexual identities and preferences. Unlike respectability, such
recognition is antithetical to a concession that is motivated by the desire for
approval, but rather stresses entitlement to recognition based on basic human
worth. A result in this perspective would be more likely to help show the
innateness or the immutability of sexual identity as the association would be
between sexual orientation or identity with inherent humanity. As Part IV will
explore, bolstering the immutability of sexual orientation, in turn, would help
clarify antidiscrimination protections for sexual minorities. The connection to
human dignity so long as the concept fosters a politics of respect over
respectability would help establish the inherency of sexual identity. Also discussed
in Part IV, dignity as respect for inherent humanity might be a helpful extension
that serves to explain away the nature of sexual orientation toward a better
understanding of its immutability—ultimately further justifying antidiscrimination
protections in the law for sexual minorities.
Second, dignity as respect offers another approach toward antidiscrimination
for sexual minorities because the idea of respect itself is in line with
antidiscrimination. As noted above in the racial discrimination cases, Heart of
Atlanta Motel and Brown, dignity has the potential for furthering equality.
Glensy’s analysis of the Supreme Court abortion cases and how construing dignity
as respect also furthers antidiscrimination. In cases such as Casey and Carhart,138
dignity’s antidiscrimination potential appears when the Supreme Court connects
the right of women to determine their reproductive health and the right to dignity
by “characteriz[ing] the idea of dignity as respect in the form of governmental non-
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interference.”139 By doing so, the Court “also introduce[d] an element of equal
treatment into the mix by coining the phrase ‘equal liberty.’”140 In this way, as
Glensy sees it, “dignity also encompasses, at least in words, an antidiscrimination
component.”141 Most importantly in this area for sexual minorities is the
association between Lawrence and the Supreme Court abortion cases, which Part
III will illustrate. According to Glensy, “[a]bortion rights cases use the concept of
dignity in a manner that mirrors Lawrence.”142
To be sure, respectability might obtain a sense of social acceptance and safety
for the individual and it might—as we will explore with the Supreme Court’s
marriage cases—pragmatically bring on developments in the short run that benefit
same-sex relationships and, by extension, sexual minorities.143 But the flaws in
respectability politics house larger implications for the struggle and further
advancement of sexual orientation antidiscrimination. As this Article’s next part
will show, in the current dialogue of gay rights, despite the achievement of
marriage equality across the United States, that conversation has left us at the
doorstep of respectability. The progressive era of gay rights has incrementally
moved away from a politics of disrespect that held once enormous indignities
against sexual minorities. However, Obergefell is a far cry from the type of dignity
imbued with the politics of respect that would ultimately have gains for
successfully advancing sexual orientation antidiscrimination.
III. FROM DISRESPECT TO RESPECTABILITY
Kees Waadiljk has long articulated that legal progress for advancing the
recognition and rights of sexual minorities in various European countries has been
animated by a peculiar “law of small change” that moves toward significant
triumphs in a series of sequences rather than a few swift and dramatic turn of
events.144 His theory, later furthered by William Eskridge145 and Yeval Merin,146
has helped exemplify that the progression toward marriage equality in the United
States was invariably a journey of incremental changes that leveraged limited
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successes within one gradual move toward equality for same-sex couples.147 In my
previous work, I have called this “marriage equality incrementalism” and
identified the significant points in the U.S. chronology toward same-sex marriage
on the federal level.148 But if marriage equality amongst all the states was just one
of such triumphs—albeit a significant one—within a larger movement toward the
rights of sexual minorities, this larger movement in itself would be punctuated and
cabined in its own incrementalism for antidiscrimination. If dignity as respect is a
normative goal in the advancement of gay rights against discrimination and has, in
some capacity, shaped the case law regarding sexual minorities, it would be
possible to track the development of dignity as respect within the major gay rights
cases at the Supreme Court as an incremental journey of its own. Indeed in Part III,
the progression for calibrating dignity with respect in these cases does arise within
a shift from the politics of deliberate indignity and disrespect to sexual minorities
toward according gays a more worthy recognition. Yet if such conceptualization of
dignity is normative, the following will show that we have only reached
respectability. We still have distances to travel.
A. Bowers and Romer: The Politics of Disrespect
There is no doubt that Bowers was a decision that singled out sexual
minorities by intentionally lacking respect for them. The Georgia anti-sodomy
statute at question in Bowers was neutral in regards to the biological sex of the
individuals committing such acts, criminalizing both same-sex or opposite-sex
sodomy.149 Yet, from the beginning of Justice White’s majority decision in
Bowers, sexual orientation was deliberately an issue. White referenced Hardwick’s
admission as a “practicing homosexual”150 and followed that reference with a
decision in which he justified anti-sodomy laws based on the reasoning that private
homosexual conduct was against traditional prevailing morality.151 His framing of
the issue as to whether there was an unenumerated but fundamental right to
homosexual sodomy permitted within Fourteenth Amendment due process was
unnecessary.152 In doing so, White narrowed the discussion from a case about
sodomy to a case about conduct that could be indicative of homosexuality.153
147
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On the one hand, this narrowing language in Bowers singled out sexual
minorities, but on the other hand, it also displaced sexual minorities and prevented
them from receiving dignified mainstream recognition. Both perspectives were
significant for disrespect because the result was that their sex and intimacy did not
deserve legal protection and in fact remained criminalized. First, Bowers’ use and
description of “homosexual sodomy” differentiated the sex involved in the case
from the category of sex acts situated in the reproductive cases and allowed the
Court to cabin it away from the reach of individual privacy rights. According to
White, heterosexual procreative sex was protectable even if it was abortive or
involved contraceptives.154 But non-procreative sex acts between same-sex
partners were not constitutionally protected because Bowers involved no childrearing, family, or marital interests whatsoever.155 This categorization of sodomy,
between same-sex and opposite-sex iterations, was the conduit for significant
disrespect toward sexual minorities in Bowers. It reflected a heteronormative
preference because it resulted in a hierarchy that placed opposite-sex sexual
partners within a protected realm and left same-sex sexual partners open to
criminal conviction.
The privacy protections denied in Bowers were significant because they
showed who and what the disrespect was directed toward. Privacy in the realm of
these cases covered individual autonomous choices that had fundamental effect to
the persons whose rights had been constitutionally violated. Correspondingly,
refusing to recognize such rights in sexual minorities who “practiced
homosexuality” denied sexual minorities recognition in the realm of sex, and
denied them autonomy to decide whether to engage in behavior that had personal
significances in intimacy, bonding, and sexual identity. Along this trajectory
Georgia has used. Unlike the Court, the Georgia Legislature has not proceeded on the
assumption that homosexuals are so different from other citizens that their lives may be
controlled in a way that would not be tolerated if it limited the choices of those other
citizens.”).
153
See John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 1119, 1155 (1999) (“Bowers called upon the Court to consider the
constitutionality of a statute that prohibited consensual sodomy. The text of the statute did
not differentiate between heterosexual and homosexual sodomy, nor did it create any
exception for married couples. The procedural history of the case, however, gave the Court
the opportunity to avoid the question of whether the law could constitutionally be applied
to heterosexual couples, and the five-Justice majority lunged at the chance to consider only
the right of the defendant before it, who had been arrested while engaging in oral sex with
another man.” (citations omitted)); see also Halley, supra note 149, at 1742 (“The majority
Justices’ deft manipulation of act and identity responded to Hardwick’s own efforts to
manage these elements by trapping Hardwick under the rubric ‘homosexual sodomy’ and
permitting heterosexual sodomy—and identity—to escape from view.”).
154
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190–91 (citing privacy and reproductive cases to challenge the
position adopted by the appellate court and respondent).
155
Id. at 191 (“No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one
hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated, either by the Court of
Appeals or by the respondent.”).
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between sex and privacy, it would not have been difficult to align the right to
practice homosexual sodomy within the concepts of privacy and individual
autonomy that were developing within the line of reproductive rights cases at the
Supreme Court—cases that defendant Hardwick and the Eleventh Circuit decision
in Bowers had relied upon to articulate their positions before the case reached this
final appeal. These cases exuded overtones of human dignity concepts despite not
invoking the concept explicitly.156 Although the association between privacy and
human dignity was not fully realized in the language of Supreme Court opinions
until Planned Parenthood v. Casey,157 the dignity concepts associated alongside
autonomy and privacy were already taking shape in prior privacy cases such as
Griswold v. Connecticut.158
156

See Barroso, supra note 62, at 347–48 (“It is within the context of the right to
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JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 36 (2007) (“Although the Court labeled these constitutional rights as
facets of the right to privacy, analysis of those cases demonstrates that the Court was
attempting to protect human dignity. Whether the decision pertained to the right to childrearing or education, or the right to use contraceptives or to undergo an abortion, the court
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from others and sustain self-worth. In fact, all of these so-called privacy rights involve
conditions which either painfully or blissfully involve a loss of privacy. In the hospital
setting, such as the abortion cases, all privacy is lost to doctors, nurses, and other
personnel. In the sexual setting, all privacy is lost to the partner. The Court was struggling
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505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965). See also Erin Daly, Human Dignity in the Roberts
Court: A Story of Inchoate Institutions, Autonomous Individuals, and the Reluctant
Recognition of a Right, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 381, 408–09 (2011).
Justice Douglas’s understanding of the intertwining nature of dignity,
privacy, and liberty would, of course, culminate in his opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut, though he had already been playing with these ideas in the criminal
law context (as seen above) and in several cases in the preceding years. And yet,
his opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut does not mention human dignity at all.
The right to privacy expounded upon in all the opinions in Griswold is
significantly narrower than Douglas’s conception of dignity, limited as it may be
to marital relations and to the “sacred precincts of marital bedrooms” and
grounded as it is in the penumbras of the first ten amendments.
But just as Justice Douglas’s focus on privacy would bear fruit in the later
abortion cases, so too would his recognition that state intrusion into the private
sphere of the individual might threaten his or her dignity. In Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, the Court wrote that “[f]ew
decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic
to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman’s decision—with the
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The Court’s lack of respect was fully realized when White further justified
Georgia’s sodomy statute by referencing prior sodomy laws to bolster the notion
that the right to engage in homosexual sodomy had not been a deeply-rooted right
under the history and tradition of the states. White reported that “[p]roscriptions
against that conduct have ancient roots”159 and then listed a historical catalogue of
sodomy laws over three consecutive footnotes to legalistically belabor his
assertion.160 Indeed, White’s sullying of homosexual sodomy here in Bowers was
an advantageous transition to his eventual reason for upholding the
constitutionality of Georgia’s anti-sodomy law. According to White, the
majoritarian view in Georgia that “homosexual sodomy is immoral and
unacceptable” was a rational basis for the law because “[t]he law . . . is constantly
based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices
are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy
indeed.”161
First, the argument for affirming the Georgia statute based on morality against
homosexuality, which White counted as strong and robust in Georgia, was rather
weak and conclusory. A majoritarian morality might contribute to the existence of
a law that discriminates and marginalizes a particular subgroup of the population
or such morality might permit laws that have bad consequences.162 Should this not
have warranted that law’s invalidity? Was this not observed in Loving v.
Virginia,163 one of the cases that White distinguishes from Hardwick’s situation?164
And what were these morals, if not reflective of heterosexism? White did not
explicitly reveal these morals in content but his reliance on the factual context of
the privacy cases—family, marriage, procreation, child-rearing—and the deeplyrootedness of sexual practices in the history of the nation tended to hint at a
heteronormative basis for these morals and values that cast sexual minorities in a
disrespectful light.

guidance of her physician and within the limits specified in Roe—whether to
end her pregnancy.”
This would find slightly fuller expression in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
where a plurality (comprising of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter)
jointly reaffirmed the principle that a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy
receives some degree of constitutional protection. As in many other cases since
Griswold, the plurality groups abortion with other decisions dealing with family,
procreation, marriage, and raising children. What is new in Casey is the turn in
the language from privacy to dignity.
Id. (citations omitted).
159
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
160
Id. at 192 nn.5–7.
161
Id. at 196.
162
See United States v. Winsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693–94 (2013); Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996).
163
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
164
Id. at 11–12.
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The message in Bowers was clear: consensual intimacy enjoyed by oppositesex couples was protectable based on the bias toward favoring the category of
procreative sex acts that emphasized traditional family morals over the category of
non-procreative consensual same-sex intimacy indicative of same-sex preferences.
White’s denial of privacy was important as far as exemplifying a politics of
disrespect because the constitutional privacy protections that were not extended to
sexual minorities also, in part, denied humanity. Accordingly, Bowers lodged
disrespect against sexual minorities engaging in consensual same-sex intimacy,
which shamed, disgraced, and criminalized them in regards to particular conduct
that could express their sexual identities. All of which White justified through a
hierarchy of protectable sex based on majoritarian values and a dismissal of
privacy interests that he would probably have championed for heterosexual
couples.
If Bowers was an example of how sexual minorities were cast within the
politics of disrespect at the Supreme Court, then Romer v. Evans, a decade later,
was an opinion that specifically associated a name with that disrespect: animus.
Ironically, the law at issue, Colorado’s Amendment 2, a voter-initiated referendum
to modify Colorado’s antidiscrimination statute to exclude protections toward
discrimination based on sexual orientation, resembled the kind of law based in a
majoritarian morality that White was reluctant to overrule in Bowers.165 In this
way, within the continuing politics of disrespect toward sexual minorities at the
Supreme Court, Bowers and Romer were antithetical. Even though Romer did not
overrule Bowers, nor did it enumerate that a fundamental right to consensual samesex intimacy existed, Romer did address the constitutionality of a law linked to
morals that would have left sexual minorities out of discrimination protections
under the Colorado state constitution.166 In interpreting Romer, Ronald Dworkin
165

See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (upholding the Georgia sodomy statute on the basis
that “the law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality”); see also Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 653 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that “Amendment 2 is
designed to prevent piecemeal deterioration of the sexual morality favored by a majority of
Coloradans”).
166
See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. In holding that Amendment 2 was constitutional,
Justice Kennedy noted that the moral purpose and intent of the law did not amount to a
legitimate governmental interest:
The primary rationale the State offers for Amendment 2 is respect for other
citizens’ freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or
employers who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality.
Colorado also cites its interest in conserving resources to fight discrimination
against other groups. The breadth of the amendment is so far removed from
these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them. We
cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose
or discrete objective. It is a status-based enactment divorced from any factual
context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests;
it is a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal
Protection Clause does not permit.

494

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

has noted that “[i]t is true that White spoke in terms of moral disapproval and
Kennedy in terms of ‘animus.’ But there can be no difference in what these words
mean in this context.”167 At least in terms of the morality specifically involved in
the facts that led to Romer, the context that influenced a Colorado voting majority
to rally behind Amendment 2—as alluded to by Dworkin—revealed the politics of
disrespect propagated by an intense campaign against protecting sexual orientation.
When antidiscrimination ordinances were enacted in Colorado municipalities
between the 1970s and early 1990s and protections based on sexual orientation
became prominent,168 a conservative Christian group in Colorado began to
campaign for signatures to put Amendment 2 on a state referendum.169 According
to Martha Nussbaum, “[t]he campaign was clever” in that the initiators of the
referendum convinced Colorado voters to pass the referendum through an “equal
rights, not special rights” theme.170 As a result, “[t]hat gave ordinary citizens a
reason to support the referendum without thinking that in so doing they were
expressing dislike of gays and lesbians.”171 The Amendment read:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual
Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or
departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions,
municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or
otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have
or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim
of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects
self-executing.172
Such campaigning might have assuaged some voters’ consciences but majoritarian
disapproval could still be articulated into law. Disrespect does not have to be
captured within the subtext of majoritarian gestures alone. The campaign for
Amendment 2 explicitly conjured a sense of immorality in order to portray sexual
minorities in a disrespectful light. And heteronormative ideals about family, sex,
and privacy versus the degradation of morals through same-sex conduct were part
of the rhetoric:

Id.

167

RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
EQUALITY 464 (2000).
168
NUSSBAUM, supra note 46, at 96.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 101.
171
Id.
172
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996) (quoting “Amendment 2”).
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You may already know that the sexual practices of gays differ drastically
from those of most of Colorado’s population. But how much these
practices differ—and the dangerous perversions they involve—may
shock you!173
Consensual same-sex behavior was again painted as choices that were morally
blameworthy, in part because the campaigns called them “dangerous” and
“perverse,” but also because the campaign affixed false assumptions with same-sex
behavior: “Gays have been unwilling (or unable) to curb their voracious, unsafe
sex practices in the face of AIDS.”174 Then it listed purported sex behavior
statistics:
Overall, surveys show that 90% of gay men engage in anal intercourse—
the most high risk sexual behavior in society today. . . . About 80% of
gay men surveyed have engaged in oral sex upon the anus of partners.
Well over a third of gays in 1977 admitted to “fisting.”175
Not only do these alleged statistics about gay male same-sex behavior place nearly
all gay men in a depraved and diseased light—with the politics of disrespect used
prominently here—but the references to same-sex sodomy and other sex practices
were of the non-procreative type outside of the morally dignifying patronage of
heteronormative values. The pamphlet’s punch line revealed this rationale in a
rhetorical question: “Is this the kind of lifestyle we want to reward with special
protection, and protected ethnic status? Gay activists want you to think they’re
‘just like you’—but these statistics point out how false that is.”176
In response, Kennedy’s decision in Romer called out such politics of
disrespect as “anything but animus toward the class it affects.”177 Unlike the
deliberate and seemingly just reliance on the politics of disrespect in Bowers to
rationalize the singling out and criminalizing of sexual minorities under the
Georgia statute, Romer found a reflective opposite in that logic. The morality was
a hateful one and its service behind Amendment 2 to disadvantage sexual
minorities was not justifiable. In fact, unlike White in Bowers, Kennedy
disregarded this relationship between morals and law even where the State
proffered that Amendment 2 offers “respect for other citizens’ freedom of
association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have
personal or religious objections to homosexuality.”178 Here inequality was not
enough to maintain efficiency. Kennedy dismissed the relationship between morals
and law, morals that engendered disapproval and disrespect, because of the
173

NUSSBAUM, supra note 46, at 94 (quoting Pamphlet from the Colorado for Family
Values on the Campaign for Colorado’s Amendment 2 to the public).
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
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Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
178
Id. at 635.
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inequality Amendment 2 perpetuated through that relationship. In doing so, the
politics of disrespect reared itself in the concept of animus. In the gay rights canon
of Supreme Court cases, Romer is definitively a case about unconstitutional
animus. Dignity was not specifically invoked by Kennedy but Romer was a postCasey decision in which privacy issues had been eventually couched in the
language and sentiments of dignity.179 There were, in the subtext, whisperings or
murmurings of humanity that will help draw the jurisprudence for gay rights
toward concepts of dignity and respect. But distinctly, Romer called out disrespect
and aligned it within a specific doctrine.
B. Lawrence as Respect
Like Bowers, Lawrence involved consensual same-sex sexual behavior that
fell within criminalization under a state sodomy statute. But with Lawrence, the
incremental journey that started with Bowers’ politics of disrespect—politics that
were later located as animus in Romer—now transitioned to recognize that sexual
minorities deserved respect. This was achieved partly through the advancement of
privacy and dignity interests in the interim between Bowers and Lawrence—
notably with Casey where the constitutional privacy rights stemming from
controversial cases such as Roe v. Wade180 that were on shakier ground during the
time of Bowers.181 The social visibility of sexual minorities in the early 1990s and
179

Culhane, supra note 153, at 1158 (“[O]ne problem with Romer is that ‘the opinion
is strikingly enigmatic in ways that make it perilous to venture strong claims about what
the case means.’ Nonetheless, several central principles can be discerned. First, the Court
emphasized and criticized the comprehensiveness of the amendment, noting that it would
place protections afforded others beyond gay men and lesbians.” (quoting Jane S. Schacter,
Romer v. Evans and Democracy’s Domain, 50 VAND. L. REV. 361, 364 (1997)).
180
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
181
See DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, THE SODOMY CASES: BOWERS V. HARDWICK AND
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 114 (2009) (“Bowers v. Hardwick was decided in a period of
considerable debate in the nation and on the Supreme Court itself about the legitimacy of
Roe v. Wade, which clearly showed in Justice White’s opinion for the Court in Bowers,
reflecting skepticism not only about Roe v. Wade but about the principle of constitutional
privacy.”). This skepticism could have also set up White’s narrow construction of the
boundaries of constitutional privacy in his refusal to extend its application to situations
involving consensual same-sex sodomy in Bowers. See Culhane, supra note 153, at 1155
n.169 (noting that “[t]he tone of Justice White’s decision makes clear his skepticism with
the entire enterprise of what he called ‘announcing rights not readily identifiable in the
Constitution’s text’” and that “[i]n addition to the just-quoted language, he stated that at
least some of the privacy cases ‘recogniz[e] rights that have little or no textual support in
the constitutional language’” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986))).
According to Culhane, White’s skepticism seems to have helped in a more exegetical
leaning toward interpreting privacy:
[Bowers] distinguished and criticized the bulwark of cases establishing and
expanding the right of privacy. Justice White made the remarkable statement
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Romer’s antidiscrimination logic seemingly also contributed to respect in
Lawrence.182
The two doctrinal approaches that facilitated Lawrence’s politics of respect
appeared early in Kennedy’s decision. The first was Kennedy’s willingness to
explore the constitutional privacy aspects of the case to imagine an unenumerated
constitutional due process protection that perhaps Bowers had failed (or refused) to
see. Kennedy’s incantation of privacy cases—Pierce v. Society of Sisters,183 Meyer
v. Nebraska,184 Griswold v. Connecticut,185 Eisenstadt v. Baird,186 Roe v. Wade,187
and Carey v. Population Services International188—began the focus on the deeper
aspects of consensual same-sex intimacy in Lawrence (and by analogy Bowers)
than White’s legalistic contrast and delineation of specific case facts alone.189 Such
incantations revisited the protections of privacy,190 autonomy,191 and
individualism192 in those cases and facilitated import into protections for
consensual same-sex intimacy.193 This connection between privacy cases and
consensual same-sex intimacy prompted the second approach to assist respect
that none of the privacy cases, nor any of ‘the rights announced in those cases[,]
bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to
engage in acts of sodomy . . . asserted in this case.’ The privacy cases were
explicitly tied to the contexts of marriage, procreation, and family from which
they arose. Since homosexual sodomy bore no connection to any of these roots,
privacy protection was unavailable.
Id. at 1155–56 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190–91).
182
As some have noted, “Lawrence . . . shows the evolution in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence as well as the increasing societal acceptance of gay persons.” Kristin D.
Shotwell, The State Marriage Cases: Implications for Hawaii’s Marriage Equality Debate
in the Post-Romer and Lawrence Era, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 653, 656 (2009). As for respect
politics building from Romer, Kennedy indicated that “[t]he foundations of Bowers have
sustained serious erosion from our recent decisions in Casey and Romer,” pointing, inter
alia, to the growing privacy and antidiscrimination concerns that prompted revisiting the
sodomy issue from Bowers. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573–76 (2003).
183
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
184
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
185
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
186
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
187
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
188
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
189
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564–68 (2003).
190
Id. at 564 (“After Griswold it was established that the right to make certain
decisions regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship.”).
191
Id. at 565 (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into the matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as to the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”
(quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972))).
192
Id. (“Roe recognized the right of a woman to make certain fundamental decision
affecting her destiny.”).
193
Id. at 566 (noting that the facts of Bowers had some similarities to Lawrence).
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politics. That approach involved the broadening of the due process issues regarding
consensual same-sex intimacy from a Bowers-like fundamental rights inquiry
regarding “homosexual sodomy” to one about the efficacy of the Texas law in
“violat[ing defendants’] vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” and of Bowers itself.194 Helped also
by his own account of the history of American sodomy laws and departing from
White’s narrative in Bowers over how ancient that “ancient roots” observation was
in the past persecution of gays,195 Kennedy’s broadening of the legal issue in
Lawrence was a crucial step toward a politics of respect as it aligned interests in
privacy and sex in Lawrence with privacy and dignity interests in Casey.
Once Kennedy invoked Casey, his reliance on Casey was not merely to
superficially show that consensual same-sex intimacy has dignity for dignity’s
sake. Casey helped leverage dignity interests so that Kennedy could use it to
dislodge the connection between the Texas law and justifications through morality
that had disrespected sexual minorities by devaluing their sex choices and behavior
as blameworthy and disgusting. Quoting Casey, Kennedy observed in a way
reminiscent of his attack on morality in Romer that:
It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers was
making the broader point that for centuries there have been powerful
voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation
has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable
behavior, and respect for the traditional family. For many persons these
are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as
ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus
determine the course of their lives. These considerations do not answer
the question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority may
use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society
through operation of the criminal law. “Our obligation is to define the
liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”196
If Romer was a case that involved disrespect as animus, Lawrence would become a
case about the respect for sexual minorities articulated through dignity interests
against the laws that attempt to marginalize them. The justification for such
judicial and constitutional regard was not based on morals but more sweeping on a
human level: “‘At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed

194

Id. at 564.
Id. at 569–71.
196
Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992)).
195
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under compulsion of the State.’”197 This shift from what animated or governed the
liberties at stake from morality to humanity was conducive to according respect for
sexual minorities.
We see this underlying effect in Kennedy’s evaluation of harm arising from
laws based on morals that regulated and inhibited aspects of humanity such as
sexual freedom. Using Romer to leverage and extend Casey, he drew from the
example of when legislation based on morals, the foundation for his concept of
animus, can cause dignitary harm. Once he associated Casey and Romer together,
Kennedy further underscored that harm from disrespect on social and human
terms:
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect
for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in
important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both
interests. If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does
so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might
remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection
reasons. When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the
State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject
homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the
private spheres.198
It all ultimately justified the holding in Lawrence that Bowers’ “continuance as
precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”199 Lawrence was the
Supreme Court’s first opinion on dignity as respect for gay rights. As a result, the
politics of respect had begun an association with the recognition of sexual minority
rights and protections.
And yet, as progressive as Lawrence was for same-sex sex partners in
overturning Bowers and decriminalizing consensual same-sex intimacy, the slight
problem with Lawrence in regards to respect politics was its narrow reading of
sexual identity typified by the facts of Lawrence itself—i.e. the convictions of
defendants because of their engaged sex acts—and by focusing the inquiry on
conduct rather than identity. In fact, the opinion emphasized conduct by discussing
the cases in terms of “the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the
person in making [reproductive] choices”200 in Casey, and in terms of how
“[e]quality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct
protected by substantive guarantee of liberty.”201 Of course, the underscoring of
choices and conduct was consistent with the way in which the issues were framed
197

Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851

(1992)).
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Id. at 575.
Id.
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to discuss “sexual intimacy” and not sexual identity. But it kept the politics of
respect adhered slightly to constitutional respect for the conduct, behavior, and
choices indicative of sexual identity, but not directly for sexual identity itself.
C. Windsor and Obergefell: Marriage and Respectability
Although there was some achievement for respect in dignity for sexual
minorities in Lawrence, the slippage created by the distance between respect
politics and toward what it was specifically modifying—sexual conduct rather than
sexual
orientation—limited
direct
progress
for
sexual
orientation
antidiscrimination. Lawrence, with its appeals to autonomy and privacy and its
inquiry regarding the constitutionality of regulating sex acts, was more about
according dignity to specific personal choices—and by extension, the
constitutional protections over conduct, choices, and acts—rather than to sexual
identity precisely. That slippage has produced mixed results for elevating
antidiscrimination protections for sexual minorities, while advancing other goals
within gay rights, particularly within the fight for marriage equality. For better or
worse, the politics of the marriage provide little guidance for developing an
inherent respect for sexual minorities. What also begins to emerge more readily
between the politics of disrespect and respect was a growing tendency toward
respectability politics.
Kennedy’s decision in United States v. Windsor202 expressed this latter
sentiment by aligning with Lawrence to protect choices,203 but also by differing in
context because the choices made were not exclusively indicative of sexual
identity. They were also choices indicative of same-sex couples vying for positive
social and legal recognition. Marriage allowed for symbolic gesturing and

202

133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
Id. at 2694–96. With a couple’s ability to marry, Kennedy found that “[t]he States’
interest in defining and regulating the marital relation, subject to constitutional guarantees,
stems from the understanding that marriage is more than a routine classification for
purposes of certain statutory benefits.” Id. at 2692. In this way, marriage was a significant
status chosen by a couple to purposefully reflect the couple’s bond: “Private, consensual
sexual intimacy between two adult persons of the same sex may not be punished by the
State, and it can form ‘but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.’” Id.
(quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567). In the context of state-sanctioned same-sex
marriages—specifically that of New York state in Windsor—Kennedy implies an analogy
between consensual same-sex intimacy in Lawrence as a way to illustrate the bond between
two people of the same sex and the marriage of a same-sex couple reflecting a similar
intimate bond. See id. (“By its recognition of the validity of same-sex marriages performed
in other jurisdictions and then by authorizing same-sex unions and same-sex marriages,
New York sought to give further protection and dignity to that bond. For same-sex couples
who wished to be married, the State acted to give their lawful conduct a lawful status.”).
Thus, protecting state-sanctioned same-sex marriages from intrusion on the federal level
would have the effect of preserving a same-sex couple’s choice to wed in a state that
allowed same-sex marriages.
203
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visibility of relationships,204 of which sexual identity has very significant import.205
However, the choice to marry shortchanged sexual orientation because marriage,
as it has been regarded modernly, has hardly been a same-sex institution or status.
Seeking marriage was toying and cooking with heteronormativity; and even the
gesture of seeking suggested that same-sex couples were vying for recognition
from an already subordinated position that led to a question of worthiness—
questions often answered by respectability.
Worthiness was what Kennedy’s decision in Windsor explored. The opinion
addressed DOMA by borrowing the doctrinal approach from Romer. Yet postLawrence, the concepts of animus and dignity in gay rights were much more
concretely and evenly realized. Animus and dignity were intertwined as an antistereotyping principle that drew out the inequality that DOMA propagated against
state-recognized same-sex marriages by consequently not recognizing them on the
federal level.206 Kennedy linked the two concepts in a correlative sense to
demonstrate how an irrational hatred against gays and their desire to marry in order
to achieve recognition—i.e. animus—manifested as a strong moral disapproval
itself within congressional intent for DOMA. Such animus or hatred could not
support a law that perpetuated inequality and stigma—i.e. harms to dignity—by
creating a hierarchy between same-sex and opposite-sex relationships on the
federal level when no such hierarchy existed between both relationship groups in
the marriage schemes of particular states that sanctioned same-sex or opposite-sex
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See, e.g., Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1078 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We need consider
only the many ways in which we encounter the word ‘marriage’ in our daily lives and
understand it, consciously or not, to convey a sense of significance. We are regularly given
forms to complete that ask us whether we are ‘single’ or ‘married.’ Newspapers run
announcements of births, deaths, and marriages. We are excited to see someone ask, ‘Will
you marry me?’, whether on bended knee in a restaurant or in text splashed across a
stadium Jumbotron.”).
205
Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious
Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CALIF. L. REV.
1169, 1197–98 (2012).
206
My previous work on marriage equality explored Kennedy’s connection of animus
and dignity concepts in Windsor as crucial to his decision to overturn DOMA. See
Jeremiah A. Ho, Once We’re Done Honeymooning: Obergefell v. Hodges, Incrementalism,
and Advances for Sexual Orientation Anti-Discrimination, 104 KY. L.J. 207, 225 (2016)
[hereinafter Ho, Honeymooning]. As I articulated, “Kennedy fit the connection [between
animus and dignity] doctrinally and centrally into his calculation of DOMA’s
unconstitutionality under equal protection.” Id. (citing Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693). Here,
“in Windsor, the connection was more fully galvanized into the reason why such
discrimination is unconstitutional.” Id. at 26 (citing Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693). This type
of connection between animus and dignity in gay rights cases is what Cary Franklin has
indicated as an anti-stereotyping principle that draws out the narrative of sexual orientation
discrimination in order to assist courts in protecting sexual minorities. See Cary Franklin,
The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 83, 119–22 (2010).
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marriages, such as New York.207 In this way, DOMA interfered with the way in
which states regulated marriage that not only stirred up discrimination against
same-sex couples but also federalism implications as well.208
Kennedy’s legislative scrutiny uncovered to no surprise that DOMA was
backed by a moral disapproval that embodied disrespect toward same-sex couples:
“The House concluded that DOMA expresses ‘both moral disapproval of
homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with
traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality.’”209 He noted that “[t]he stated
purpose of [DOMA] was to promote an ‘interest in protecting the traditional moral
teachings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage laws.’”210 Animus served to
enliven DOMA and was instilled by disrespect toward minority sexual orientations
that preferred to keep same-sex couples out of marriage. The next question was
whether that animus, as in Romer, also contained a bare desire to harm, which
Kennedy found in its ability “to identify a subset of state-sanctioned
marriages . . . and make them unequal. The principal purpose is to impose
inequality, not for other reasons like governmental efficiency.”211 That was its
“principal effect.”212
207

See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. Upon opining that “DOMA seeks to injure the
very class New York seeks to protect,” he explained that “[i]n determining whether a law is
motived by an improper animus or purpose, ‘“[d]iscriminations of an unusual character”’
especially require careful consideration” and that “DOMA cannot survive under these
principles.” Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)). What Kennedy saw
was that marriage was an important state regulation. Id. (“The responsibility of the States
for the regulation of domestic relations is an important indicator of the substantial societal
impact the State’s classifications have in the daily lives and customs of its people.”). In this
way, DOMA’s interference from the federal angle was too much and created a divide
between protected married opposite-sex couples and unprotected married same-sex couples
on the federal level when there was no such division in state-regulated marriage scheme
that permitted same-sex couples such as that of New York state. Id. (“DOMA’s unusual
deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage
here operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come
with the federal recognition of their marriages. This is strong evidence of a law having the
purpose and effect of disapproval of that class. The avowed purpose and practical effect of
the law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma
upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of
the States.”).
208
Id. at 2692 (discussing how New York state’s efforts toward same-sex marriages
“were without doubt a proper exercise of its sovereign authority within our federal system,
all in the way that the Framers of the Constitution intended. The dynamics of state
government in the federal system are to allow the formation of consensus respecting the
way the members of a discrete community treat each other in their daily contact and
constant interaction with each other.”).
209
Id. at 2693 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 16 (1996)).
210
Id.
211
Id. at 2694.
212
Id.
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Hence, the concept of dignity in Romer and Lawrence found accord with
Windsor. Inequality as harm in DOMA had dignity implications beyond rights and
benefits. As Kennedy observed, that harm was also figurative because the rights
and incidents denied federally “enhance the dignity and integrity of the person.”213
However, unlike the dignity of the freedom of couples to engage in same-sex
intimacy in Lawrence—where dignity precluded morally blameworthy judgment
regarding those intimate choices that could translate into disrespect—Kennedy
discussed the harm through dignity with more subjectivity here in Windsor,
expressly illustrating how the inequality of DOMA created a discussion of
worthiness. At first the language seemed to direct us toward the type of dignity in
Lawrence:
By creating two contradictory marriage regimes within the same State,
DOMA forces same-sex couples to live as married for the purpose of
state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law, thus diminishing
the stability and predictability of basic personal relations the State has
found it proper to acknowledge and protect.214
Then, however, it appeared that Kennedy veered strictly away from that course by
defining dignity as worthiness: “By this dynamic DOMA undermines both the
public and private significance of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages; for it tells
those couples, and all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy
of federal recognition.”215
Shortly thereafter, Kennedy returned to discussing how the inequality or
“differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the
Constitution protects.”216 Yet then Kennedy also noted that the inequality has led
to demeaning the couple “whose relationship the State has sought to dignify.”217
The vacillation between the inequality of DOMA that demeaned or disrespected
same-sex couples and the dignified status that traditional heteronormative marriage
conveyed upon same-sex couples if recognized creates ambiguity. One reading
could be that marriage dignified all relationships because that has been a social
norm—regardless of opposite-sex or same-sex coupling. And yet another reading
could be that marriage dignified same-sex relationships in the ways that no existing
commitment status in same-sex relationships could. This ambiguity begged the
question: what would make same-sex couples worthy to be dignified through
marriage? This duality has added a spoonful of the politics of respectability in
Windsor’s attempts to address gay rights and discrimination.
Additionally, it is the decision to marry—i.e. the choices and conduct—that
the politics of respect and respectability go toward enhancing, not sexual
213
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orientation itself. All of this mediating was calibrated towards conduct and choices
and the worth of such effort, rather than respect for sexual identity or orientation:
For same-sex couples who wished to be married, the State acted to give
their lawful conduct a lawful status. This status is a far-reaching legal
acknowledgment of the intimate relationship between two people, a
relationship deemed by the State worthy of dignity in the community
equal with all other marriages.218
This result in Windsor created much more equality amongst married couples,
same-sex or otherwise. But was it equality tempered by respectability? What did
this do for sexual orientation directly?
Obergefell probed at deeper questions about the way sexual minorities had
negotiated themselves into a favorable status within the law and by extension
within society at large. Obergefell’s advancement for marriage equality was
obviously great. But from Obergefell, the advancement for sexual orientation
antidiscrimination was not quite as absolute. At first, on the constitutional level,
Kennedy’s due process inquiry would seem to be helpful towards equality because
the broadness of a “fundamental right to marry” inquiry versus a “fundamental
right to same-sex marriage” inquiry invited comparisons with the way the
constitutional issue of sodomy was framed in Lawrence. In Obergefell, as it was in
Lawrence, the inquiry here was set broadly and not narrowly, thus allowing for
extension to same-sex couples of the fundamental right to marry.219
But whatever potential the broadness of Kennedy’s due process inquiry in
Obergefell might have connoted, the actual shape and perspective of Obergefell’s
due process inquiry was not quite like Lawrence after all. Lawrence’s fundamental
rights inquiry regarding sodomy laws was an example of a resolution cast more so
under a negative rights inquiry, involving questions into unnecessary or
unconstitutional state burdens on individual liberties.220 Even if the conclusion held
that sexual minorities have constitutional rights to engage in consensual sex that
had been otherwise criminalized by state sodomy laws and therefore invalidated
such sodomy laws, the state burdens upon liberties were ultimately phrased
negatively and not positively in Lawrence.221 In Obergefell, the Fourteenth
Amendment due process inquiry was cast under a positive rights analysis—
218
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The issues in Obergefell involved whether the Fourteenth Amendment “requires a
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whether the fundamental right to marry for opposite-sex couples extends to samesex couples.222
In some ways, the differences also revealed the disparities between state
criminalization of same-sex intimacy and state bans on recognizing same-sex
marriages. In Bowers and Lawrence, same-sex couples were already engaging in
consensual sexual activity long before the enforcement of anti-sodomy laws. By
contrast, in Obergefell, because marriage was a state-sanctioned legal institution
only open to opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples were not legally married prior
to state marriage bans. In this way, it was hard to articulate that same-sex couples
had a practice or choice in marriage that was constitutionally protected and
subsequently infringed upon by state marriage bans. Instead, in Obergefell, the
Court’s answer to the fundamental right to marriage question was resolved in a
more positive rather than negative rights approach, recognizing that same-sex
couples should have fundamental marriage rights that they did not have under the
Constitution the night before the Obergefell decision.223 Ultimately, the
distinctions between Lawrence and the realities of litigating the same-sex marriage
issue could be reconciled through an expansive reading of Lawrence, drawing on
its broadness and moments of commingling liberty and equality on issues of sex,
privacy, and relationships to influence and resolve the same-sex marriage
debate.224 But in Obergefell, the distinctions also led to a compromise for sexual
orientation antidiscrimination in the decision’s promise of marriage rights to samesex couples, whereas an equality inquiry in Obergefell contingent on finding
marriage bans discriminated based on sexual orientation might not.225
222

See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2640 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision
casts that truth aside. In its haste to reach a desired result, the majority misapplies a clause
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Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 147, 168 (2015) [hereinafter Yoshino, Freedom] (“Justice Kennedy’s use of ‘liberty’
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David D. Meyer, A Privacy Right to Public Recognition of Family Relationships?
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There are other reasons that Kennedy’s fundamental rights inquiry
compromised advancement for sexual orientation antidiscrimination. Kennedy’s
application of the fundamental right to marry for same-sex couples in Obergefell
extended an institution, practice, and/or status that even he explicitly emphasized
as something that historically has been heterosexist.226 This heterosexism
underscored a heteronormative bias that Kennedy had to downplay or at least insist
that the traditional practice of marriage was evolving.227 Either way, he uses the
heterosexual characteristic of “traditional” marriage as an implicit demarcation line
of exclusion.228 This was his starting point. The bigger implication of this starting
point was that Kennedy’s judicial extension of the right to marry possibly imported
same-sex couples into a heteronormative world. In this way, the Obergefell
decision recognized and preserved the heterosexual presence of marriage,
envisioned same-sex couples as seeking the right to marry, and invariably played
the dynamics in order to extend that right to same-sex couples by relying on
respectability politics.
Respectability politics in Obergefell emerged first through Kennedy’s version
of marriage—how it possessed and imparted dignity through its transformative
powers based on its historical connotations—and secondly from his evaluation of
whether same-sex couples, who were asking for marriage, should be extended that
right. At the decision’s opening, Kennedy situated his marriage ruling within the
language of dignity and identity, praising marriage as something that offered
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See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594 (“There are untold references to the beauty of
marriage in religious and philosophical texts spanning time, cultures, and faiths, as well as
in art and literature in all their forms. It is fair and necessary to say these references were
based on the understanding that marriage is a union between two persons of the opposite
sex.”).
227
Id. at 2595 (“The history of marriage is one of both continuity and change. That
institution—even as confined to opposite-sex relations—has evolved over time.”).
Kennedy asserted that “[a]s the role and status of women changed, the institution further
evolved.” Id. He begins setting an illustration of the evolution of marriage by reminding the
reader of coverture—that “[u]nder the centuries-old doctrine of coverture, a married man
and woman were treated by the State as a single, male-dominated legal entity.” Id. (citing
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 430 (1765)). However,
Kennedy gets to the heart of his illustration by mentioning how the abandonment of
coverture was a reflection of times: “As women gained legal, political, and property rights,
and as society began to understand that women have their own equal dignity, the law of
coverture was abandoned.” Id. His illustration here allowed him to observe that “[i]ndeed,
changed understandings of marriage are characteristic of a Nation where new dimensions
of freedom become apparent to new generations, often through perspectives that begin in
pleas or protests and then are considered in the political sphere and the judicial process.”
Id. at 2596.
228
Id. at 2594 (paraphrasing the sentiment by marriage equality opponents that
“[m]arriage, in their view, is by its nature a gender-differentiated union of man and
woman” and that “[t]his view long has been held—and continues to be held—in good faith
by reasonable and sincere people here and throughout the world”).
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“promised nobility and dignity”229 and “allows two people to find a life that could
not be found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons.”230 It
came as no surprise after Lawrence and Casey that Obergefell would have relied
on dignity interests in order to articulate the constitutional implications in a
couple’s decision to marry. He spoke of marriage in the most human sense—
quoting Confucius and Cicero, and generalizing the “beauty of marriage”
expressed in religion, philosophy, and art.231 But the transcendent qualities of
marriage are limited; they are shortly tempered by Kennedy’s “fair and necessary”
realization that “these references [to marriage] were based on the understanding
that marriage is a union between two persons of the opposite sex.”232 This
realization was an indication that Kennedy seemed to locate marriage within
heteronormative traditions and values.
His full-throated vagueness here, like in Windsor, created slippage. Though
Obergefell ultimately extended a fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples,
the positive rights framing of the issue did not offer respect for sexual identity or
even same-sex couples but a possible respectability. Marriage has not been an
inherent entitlement for same-sex couples as it has been for opposite-sex couples
since antiquity. As a long-standing heterosexual status and practice, marriage
dignified relationships and was being sought by same-sex couples who wanted to
be legally recognized. Ultimately, they had to show that they had earned it first.
We see this evaluation in the thrust of Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell. As he
justified extending marriage, he revisited concepts of animus and dignity and
intertwined them as he did in Windsor as an anti-stereotyping principle to mediate
toward respectability. The correlation between animus that propagated laws and
the harms to dignity was at once a narrative structure in which a history of
exclusion of sexual minorities and same-sex relationships were uncovered—a
history that bore constitutional significance because it was animated by hatred and
disrespect toward sexual minorities and created the marriage bans at issue, and
consequently a history of legal exclusion stemming from animus that resulted in
bans on certain personal choices that limited autonomy in such a way that harmed
human dignity. But because the mediating goal was marriage equality through
respectability, both animus and dignity were calibrated to that effect in Obergefell.
The use of animus and dignity as an anti-stereotyping device that channeled
toward the right to marriage in Obergefell led Kennedy to discuss distinctly the
dignity implications of marriage alongside acknowledging the dignitary harms that
exclusion from marriage caused. Here Obergefell’s reliance on dignity focused on
how much having a marriage right conferred dignity and how same-sex couples
now qualified to get that right. According to Kennedy, there were “four principles
and traditions [that] demonstrate[d] that the reasons marriage is fundamental under
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the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.”233 Essentially, these
four principles and traditions allowed Kennedy to specifically evaluate the
qualifications of same-sex couples to be given the right to marry. Each of these
principles and traditions dealt, in their own manner, with what marriage conferred
upon a couple and how same-sex couples—as far as each principle and tradition
was concerned—qualified to receive marriage.
The first principle was the importance of marriage for facilitating personal
choice, autonomy, and self-definition: “Choices about marriage shape an
individual’s destiny.”234 The way in which Kennedy justified conferring marriage
to same-sex couples from this aspect of marriage was connected to dignity: “There
is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry and in
their autonomy to make such profound choices.”235 Curiously, Kennedy identified
this dignity and used it to find same-sex couples were sufficiently qualified to
receive the right to marry. Yet, had Kennedy avoided qualifications and merely
described the harms to dignity that animus-filled bans on marriage have had on
decisions in their relationships, this “sufficient” qualification would have likely
connoted less respectability through dignity and more on respect.
Similarly in the second principle and tradition of marriage that Kennedy
analyzed, where marriage “supports a two-person union unlike any other in its
importance to the committed individuals,”236 a likewise rhetorical theme arose in
which Kennedy discussed what marriage conferred and whether same-sex couples
qualified enough to obtain the right to marry, rather than showing the harms to
personal dignity. Marriage “dignifies couples who ‘wish to define themselves by
their commitment to each other.’”237 Since such couples had traditionally been
opposite-sex ones, the dignifying characteristic of marriage reflected a
paternalistic, heteronormative value that placed married opposite-sex couples
above cohabiting opposite-sex couples. The type of dignity that marriage gives was
not about inherent dignity that was entitled to respect but about respectability
accorded to couples who chose to register themselves as married rather than
unmarried. Likewise, this principle would expand similarly amongst same-sex
couples, creating a hierarchy between married and unmarried same-sex couples.
Again, the discussion of this second attribute of marriage was imbued with a
certain dignity that is achieved based on worthiness obtained from a comparison to
opposite-sex couples and not inherent entitlement or respect.
On the surface, the third attribute seemed to possess a difference from the first
two as it appeared to discuss the dignitary harms that families with same-sex
parents suffered because of the exclusion out of wedlock.238 Marital rights of
parents also impart substantive rights, incidents, and presumptions of parenting in
233
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certain instances that escaped unmarried parents with children, particularly if there
are no blood relations.239 Absent rights to marry, children of unmarried same-sex
parents lack legitimacy: “Without the recognition, stability, and predictability
marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are
somehow lesser.”240 The stigma—or dignitary harm—might be disrespect because
of the heterosexist hierarchy marriage created, but the bigger message here was
that marriage was the foremost way to connote family. This, again, like the
previous aspect regarding marriage, was a traditional but somewhat outdated
view—both arcane toward modern families and ironic in its injection in a case
about the changing face of marriage.
To be sure, marriage can have major social benefits to parents and families.
But the harm to dignity should be about the potential for segregating between
families of same-sex couples and unmarried opposite-sex couples on the one hand,
and married opposite-sex couples on the other. The stigma was about
discrimination if one class of families was favored over another based on the
values placed on the constructed status of marriage.241 Families were not
“somehow lesser” inherently because they stood outside the institution of
marriage. Rather the more correct perspective was that families should be viewed
as having inherent dignities to be respected under the law.
Finally, the last attribute Kennedy mentioned to justify extending the right to
marry to same-sex couples was its symbolism. “[M]arriage is a keystone of our
social order,” Kennedy wrote, and as a result of that social exultation of marriage,
“just as a couple vows to support each other, so does society pledge to support the
couple, offering symbolic recognition and material benefits to protect and nourish
the union.”242 Once again, marriage gives something at the pinnacle of social
order—or heteronormative hierarchy—it gives legitimacy to the marrying couples.
Since same-sex couples were traditionally excluded from marriage, they have
suffered from denials in certain privileges attached to marriage: “Yet by virtue of
their exclusion from that institution, same-sex couples are denied the constellation
of benefits that the States have linked to marriage.”243 But that harm also had
symbolic connotations because “[s]ame-sex couples are consigned to an instability
many opposite-sex couples would deem intolerable in their own lives.”244 This
observation was the closest to describing harm to dignity from the animus and
disrespect to same-sex couples that would require redress through marriage
calibrated in respect.
However, after describing this harm, what followed was respectability:
“Same-sex couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and
seek fulfillment in its highest meaning.”245 The focus here should have been fully
239
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on the dignitary harm that the marriage exclusion inflicted on same-sex couples
and not to the dignifying qualities of marriage and its symbolism. With that last
statement, the sentiment became again patronizing, drawing this section back to
respectability politics.
After all these justifications, Kennedy pronounced that same-sex couples must
be given the fundamental right to marriage. He used the animus-dignity connection
as a mediating device, an anti-stereotyping principle, to evaluate whether that
extension would be justifiable based on analogous interests that he viewed samesex couples shared in their relationships versus the essential attributes that
marriage embodied. What was problematic here was that the objective of marriage
equality was preceded and affected by the politics of respectability. In turn, that
respectability was being channeled by the animus-dignity connection to justify the
worthiness of same-sex couples in seeking and obtaining marriage for themselves.
Marriage, as Kennedy portrayed either knowingly or inadvertently, conferred not
only dignity through respectability but heteronormative values and demands that
might have expected same-sex couples to negotiate their subjugation once
marriage was available to them. This was not dignity as respect, which would have
been ideal, but it was dignity as respectability, which deviated from Lawrence.
From the politics of disrespect in Bowers to respect in Lawrence and now to
the politics of respectability in Obergefell, progress seems to have stalled if human
worth is earned and not inherently respected. One might surmise that progress
would have been more absolute—linear in trajectory. But more true to political
incrementalism, lasting change may come from a spiraling movement that must
process back and forth, from one station of progress to another. Accordingly, once
respect was obtained in Lawrence, it was not impossible to conceive of Obergefell
veering off course, which it did. The question in Part IV is how to correct the
course.
IV. RESTORING RESPECT
For same-sex relationships and families, obtaining nationwide marriage
recognition at the Supreme Court was a monumental step—even in the face of past
criticisms regarding the Court’s efficacy for formal equality.246 Justifiably, after
decades of political disrespect towards same-sex relationships in denying requests
for marriage, Obergefell was a cause for genuine celebration, in real life and on
social media. Marriage imports rights and benefits to support relationships and
families that an otherwise unmarried status would not. And symbolically, the
recognition of marriage provides some legitimization of same-sex relationships
and families from the dominant culture, which consequently brings visibility and
acceptance to the lives of sexual minorities.
246
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There are limitations, however, to the specific procurement of marriage
equality in Obergefell. From an ideological perspective, the Ettelbrick/Stoddard
concerns, predictions, and observations linger cautiously regarding its efficacy and
value, as marriage characteristically was the epitome of monogamous heterosexual
relationships that promoted heteronormative—and arguably heterosexist—views
on family, childrearing, sexuality, and gender.247 Its traditional subordination of
women—which still has remnants here and there—poses difficult implications for
same-sex relationships and how they are perceived or subordinated by the
dominant culture.248
An institution that, by itself, historically fostered the subordination of women
in ways analogically similar to Adrienne Rich’s concept of “compulsory
heterosexuality,”249 could suggest its incompatibility with the symbolic recognition
of same-sex relationships—unless same-sex relationships affirmatively and
unapologetically undergo an appropriation of marriage that connects the symbolic
importance of marriage to the substantive merits and values of gay existence.250
That development would align itself with Thomas Stoddard’s original thoughts and
hopes for same-sex marriage in 1989.251 Otherwise, Ettelbrick’s view might prevail
somewhat more strongly as the politics of respectability extends into the postObergefell period, allowing for heteronormative values to potentially morph and
cross over into same-sex relationships.252
Doctrinally speaking, this milestone in the marriage equality movement
leaves gay rights at the Supreme Court with a strong admission of respectability
politics that could functionally and philosophically inhibit long-term
antidiscrimination advances for sexual minorities. Kennedy’s use of dignity in
247
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Obergefell, which leaves us in the politics of respectability—in the realms of rank
and hierarchy—should provoke unease as the likelihood for stratification
continues, this time more subtly than outright disrespect (as in Bowers).
Respectability politics reinforces social hierarchies and places heterosexual values
over the values of other groups in exchange for acceptance that is fundamentally
less egalitarian from the get-go. The realities of Obergefell from this examination
here indicate we are still in a place where heteronormative values frame our ideas
about sexual identity and orientation in ways that might stave off a more true-toform theory of human existence within formal equality. In addition, that gap is
even furthered by the fundamental rights approach that focused on extending the
marriage right to same-sex couples but gave short shrift to the equal protection
potential for sexual orientation antidiscrimination. The unanswered questions
regarding heightened protections for sexual orientation from Windsor continue to
linger. Sexual minorities cannot avail themselves of protected classifications under
the Fourteenth Amendment, but they are, at least, respectable.
Yet even if it seems that in the contest between #LoveWins and #GayWins,
where the former has prevailed over the latter, hope still resides. None of this is
ever a total and infinite loss. Observations about progress in the gay rights
movement often expose incrementalist tendencies in which intervals of smaller
advances eventually culminate into bigger, more significant changes. The theory of
political incrementalism posits that progress on a heavy societal topic pressing the
consciousness of a large body politic often resembles the slow mental ruminations
that a person might engage in over an important issue.253 Change vacillates back
and forth between the pros and cons until a clear resolution is reached—a two steps
forward, one step back approach.254
Even within the road to marriage equality, the movements and shifts toward
Obergefell on the federal level did not advance cleanly from one stage to another,
but rather spiraled back and forth along a trajectory in which the changing norms
for gay rights finally propelled us forward to marriage.255 One of the important acts
that drove this shape of progress was the repeated and persistent leveraging of one
victory, however large or small, for another victory down the line, and so on and so
forth. This notion of incrementalism—specifically in gay rights—is compounded
with the observations that countries slow down on gay rights after marriage256
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creating an urgency, ignored by popular imagination, that proponents of gay rights
must overcome in order to then carefully springboard to further advancements in
sexual orientation antidiscrimination that are more truly egalitarian and more
precisely locate the existence of sexual minorities within the politics of respect.
Interestingly, within the year after Obergefell, the national debate over gay
rights has persisted, in part because of some resistance to change prompted by gay
rights leverage. After Obergefell, the backlash toward same-sex couples came in
the form of those who were reluctant to enforce the marriage decision—often
basing refusal on their religious consciences.257 In early 2016, those refusals
subsided and gave way to the rise of anti-LGBTQ legislation that eliminated
antidiscrimination protections for sexual minorities and bills that would not
accommodate transgender use of public restrooms.258 Then in June 2016, the
shooting at a gay Latino nightclub in Orlando brought back national attention to
the dignity of LGBTQ individuals directly within the context of domestic
terrorism.259 All of these incidents prolong a lingering sense of disrespect politics
toward sexual minorities that poses tension with the respectability politics of
Obergefell. They also pose opportunities to dialogue about respect politics that
ought to be conferred upon sexual minorities and their constitutional rights as
citizens.260
On the federal level, absent legislation that guarantees protections against
discrimination—such as Title VII—constitutional case law should continue to
develop and underscore individual rights protections for sexual minorities.261
Accordingly, the same Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection
realm should serve as a doctrinal venue to stretch gay rights advocacy in a countermajoritarian way that could perhaps provoke a supportive legislative response
down the line. Now that major gay rights litigation can continue more steadily
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outside the direct context of marriage,262 discrimination cases under both due
process and equal protection theories can litigate more directly over discrimination
based on sexual orientation rather than discrimination over relationship status.
Such judicial inquiry into discrimination based on sexual orientation could focus
itself back to identity without as many contextual filters that allow courts to take
themselves away from difficult conversations regarding the acceptance of minority
sexual orientations, particularly now that the climate for sexual minorities is more
open and promising in the post-Obergefell era.
Consequentially, these future cases must persist with exploring and preserving
the dignity interests of sexual minorities. Dignity from Lawrence still has its
currency and should not be abandoned in judicial advancements in sexual
orientation. Rather, pro-gay litigants must now continue to draw upon dignity, in
part, to couch their cases against discrimination post-Obergefell—except that
dignity must not trigger a politics of respectability. It must be recalibrated back
towards a politics of respect, where it serves to advance an entitlement and not
worth that is earned. Thus, Part IV will examine the possibilities of furthering the
connections between respect politics and rights advances of sexual minorities.
Subpart A will explore possibilities within the doctrinal realm of fundamental
rights. Subpart B will proceed similarly within equality jurisprudence.
A. Dignity and Respect in Fundamental Rights
In the due process context, if indeed Kenji Yoshino’s vision regarding the end
of equal protection doctrine is correct and due process liberty protections provide
the future engines of constitutional change for marginalized groups,263 then the
opportunities that were available for the use of dignity in Lawrence and Obergefell
ought likely to continue in future cases that deal with violations of fundamental
rights issues. Shortly, within the immediate aftermath of Obergefell, both Nan
Hunter and Laurence Tribe in their own respects concurred with Yoshino about
due process jurisprudence—at least that the rise of liberty has underscored the
triumphs of sexual minorities against discrimination in constitutional case law.264
And in Obergefell specifically, Yoshino articulated that Kennedy’s opinion was
furthering an approach in substantive due process jurisprudence that favors a more
“open-ended common law approach.”265
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See, e.g., Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1248 (11th Cir. 2017) (dealing
with an appeal by employee alleging sexual orientation discrimination by an employer
hospital); Lively v. Fletcher Hosp., Inc., No. 1:16-CV-00031 (W.D.N.C. 2016) (suing for
employment discrimination under Title VII, inter alia, under sexual orientation).
263
See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 796
(2011).
264
See Nan D. Hunter, Interpreting Liberty and Equality Through the Lens of
Marriage, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 107, 108 (2015); Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity:
Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 16–17 (2015).
265
Yoshino, Freedom, supra note 223, at 149.
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Yoshino traced open-ended common law approach to Justice Harlan’s dissent
in Poe v. Ullman,266 which was later followed by Casey.267 As Yoshino
summarizes, Harlan’s approach “outlined a balancing methodology that weighed
individual liberties against governmental interests in a reasoned manner. Such an
approach always occurred against a backdrop of tradition, but was not shackled to
the past, not least because tradition was itself ‘a living thing.’”268 The antithesis of
this approach was the more “formulaic” one that the Court used in Washington v.
Glucksberg,269 where “to be recognized as a due process liberty a right had to be
‘“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,”’ and ‘“implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.”’ It also required a ‘“careful description”’ of the
asserted fundamental interest.”270 In this way, “the Court was more open to
recognizing negative ‘freedom from’ rights than positive ‘freedom to’ rights—
though to be clear, it did not formally require the alleged right to fall on the
‘negative-right’ side of the divide.”271
From the differences between his majority opinion in Lawrence and that of
Justice White’s in Bowers, one could already anticipate Kennedy’s preference for a
more one-ended—perhaps more holistic—approach in Obergefell. In Lawrence,
the intimate association of consensual same-sex partners was couched in broader
terms so that privacy concerns could draw forth the fundamental rights violations.
In contrast, Bowers executed a narrower categorization of sexual acts between
same-sex and opposite-sex couples that followed from the use of a more formulaic
approach to substantive due process, which permitted morality to stifle any
fundamental rights recognition and protection. The focus from the benefits of the
liberty approaches in Lawrence and Obergefell combined is what Yoshino calls an
“antisubordination liberty”272 that the Court, in Yoshino’s words, can use to “guide
a proper understanding of the guarantee of ‘liberty’ in the future (as it has in the
past)”273 and perhaps provide for “[d]iscerning new liberties” as “more an art than
a science.”274
The bigger implication from Yoshino is that “[t]his increased emphasis could
serve to close as well as to open new channels of liberty. For this reason, this new
birth of freedom is also a new birth of equality.”275 A conclusion about Obergefell
in this way elevates its potential beyond the decision’s landmark utility for
bringing marriage to same-sex relationships and serving to dignify same-sex
couples and their families. There is a saving grace here if an anti-subordination
concept is paired with the Court’s parting words in Obergefell—that beyond
266

367 U.S. 497 (1961).
Yoshino, Freedom, supra note 223, at 149.
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521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
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marriage same-sex couples “ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law”276 and
that “[t]he Constitution grants them that right.”277 From Obergefell into future
cases addressing marginalization of rights based on a bias against a minority sexual
orientation, dignity rights articulation should continue to be strengthened.
Nan Hunter notes that post-Obergefell, “[a]dditional challenges to laws that
restrict liberty within the zone of intimate association seem inevitable”278—which
seems to broaden potential discrimination cases here beyond the marriage
context:279
The Supreme Court has described the prototype of intimate association
as relationships that involve “deep attachments and commitments to the
necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a
special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also
distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.” Cases brought on this
ground have often involved plaintiffs who were fired from public sector
jobs, frequently in law enforcement, for beginning romantic relationships
with co-workers or offenders in violation of agency policies.280
But Hunter seems to be unsure on “how the liberty right recognized in Obergefell
will interact with government policies that ban or impose penalties for intimate
associations in workplace or other settings.”281 Applying an anti-subordination
concept to the equal dignity concept in Obergefell that competed with
respectability politics in that case might serve to help answer Hunter’s uncertainty.
The pairing in future due process cases could solidify dignity interests and rights
when dealing with fundamental rights violations with a sexual orientation
component—perhaps discrimination of same-sex cohabitation based outside of
marriage (taking us in the context somewhere between Lawrence and Obergefell)
or in cases that somehow pit sexual orientation with First Amendment rights and
public accommodations.
Tribe noted that “[t]he doctrine of equal dignity signals the beginning of the
end for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in areas like employment
and housing, which remains legal in many states and has yet to be expressly
banned in federal legislation.”282 Accordingly, dignity in due process cases is less
nebulous as critics have noted; instead, “[t]he constitutional principle of equal
dignity also gives the lie to public officials who discriminate against LGBT
individuals.”283 In Tribe’s First Amendment example that mentions Kim Davis,284
Tribe notes:
276
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As the Obergefell majority makes clear, the First Amendment must
protect the rights of such individuals, even when they are agents of
government, to voice their personal objections—this, too, is an essential
part of the conversation—but the doctrine of equal dignity prohibits them
from acting on those objections, particularly in their official capacities,
in a way that demeans or subordinates LGBT individuals and their
families by preventing them from giving legal force to their marriage
vows.285
If there is a continued trend to couple dignity with the anti-subordination approach
from Obergefell outside the marriage context, the use of dignity might ultimately
produce cases that achieve some progress for antidiscrimination based on
fundamental rights theories. It might help to restore respect politics.
Of course, the doctrinal conundrum with future due process victories is not
associated with any discontinued use of dignity, but rather with whether due
process LGBTQ cases will be able to fully achieve antidiscrimination protections
for sexual minorities in the most formal constitutional sense. After all, due process
cases premised on discrimination against sexual minorities often address laws
singling out conduct, rather than identity.286 To that end, conduct, rather than
identity, might pose limits to due process. For instance, in her criticism of
Obergefell, Elizabeth Cooper noted that Kennedy’s dependence on due process in
Obergefell potentially undermines LGBTQ antidiscrimination efforts because any
furtherance of the rights of sexual minorities from a formal equality perspective
was missing:
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The county clerk from Kentucky who personally challenged the Obergefell ruling
by refusing to issue marriage licenses until she was able to do so in a way that was aligned
with her religious beliefs.
285
Tribe, supra note 264, at 30; see also Yoshino, Freedom, supra note 223, at 173
(“By basing its ruling on the Due Process Clause (this time in addition to, rather than in
lieu of, the Equal Protection Clause), the Obergefell Court required the equality of the
vineyard. And even then, as we have seen, some state actors have chosen to refuse to issue
marriage licenses across the board rather than to issue them to same-sex couples. Those
actors violate a due process ruling in a way that would not violate an equal protection
ruling.”).
286
See Pamela S. Karlan, Foreward: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447,
1457 (2004) (discussing how “regulation of particular acts in which gay people
engage . . . seems most amenable to analysis under the liberty prong of the Due Process
Clause,” even though gay people could also be regulated by status or “who they are in the
public sphere”).
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Justice Kennedy’s failure to clarify the level of scrutiny that ought to
apply to claims brought by LGB litigants has led some to express
concern that efforts to secure protections against discrimination in
employment, housing, and public accommodations will be stymied.
Thus, the most trenchant concern is that liberty and dignity, while
appealing on a philosophical level, will not be helpful in a pragmatic
sense.287
In accomplishing the most meaningful sexual orientation antidiscrimination
advances, respect politics and doctrinal advancements must not only accompany
each other but also be optimized. Prior to Obergefell, the line of due process cases
in reproduction that ultimately helped shape Lawrence’s fundamental liberty
analysis for decriminalizing conduct indicative of same-sex intimacy had
emphasized autonomy and privacy as the underlying rationale for rights
protection.288 Indeed Lawrence did borrow from those cases the fundamental rights
rationale in the context of same-sex relationships and accorded dignity and respect
to intimacy, but the doctrinal advancement under due process was toward
protecting conduct indicative of same-sex intimacy and relationships, not sexual
identities per se. Such due process protections might still have potency against
discrimination. But such victories would still skirt around any discussions about
the intrinsic humanity of sexual minorities that would evoke respect toward their
identities (rather than their conduct) and would consequently lead to formal sexual
orientation antidiscrimination advances. Not to mention, the influence of
Obergefell as a due process case might undermine respect politics if such cases
dealing with conduct occur within the context of marriage, family, or same-sex
relationships.
B. Respect in Equal Protection
Other than due process theories, the politics of respect could be revived in
future equal protection cases post-Obergefell. In this following section, I describe
two possibilities: dignity and respect in rationality cases, and respect and suspect
classification cases.
1. Dignity and Respect in Rationality Cases
Even if equal protection is relied upon instead of due process for propagating
and justifying dignity interests after Obergefell, dignity as respect could still
resurge as a concept that animates the invidiousness of discrimination based on
minority sexual orientation. The shell of dignity from Windsor, despite it being
from a marriage case, has a lot of potential to be imported from one equality
287

Elizabeth B. Cooper, The Power of Dignity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 3, 18–19 (2015)
(citations omitted).
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See supra Part III.
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jurisprudence case to another. Again, no longer limited to the marriage context,
equal protection claims based on sexual orientation would side-step entirely one
probable circumstance that could divert discussions purely on the basis of
discrimination to those based on sameness—thus incurring notions of
respectability. What is left behind from Windsor is the doctrinal use of lower
scrutiny based on animus that evolved from Romer, later solidified by Windsor in
its more searching form of scrutiny toward discrimination against same-sex
couples—despite questions of whether it was a higher form of rational basis or
something else.289 In addition, the narrative structure of sexual orientation
discrimination based on sexual orientation could also survive in future cases by
carrying over the animus-dignity connection that exposes how animus behind a
discriminatory exclusion of sexual minorities correspondingly violate their dignity
interests because it sustains a politics of disrespect. Between Romer and Windsor,
one could argue that their more searching forms of rationality are not completely
sustained or governed by the bounds of formal rationality, but exhibit something
else more elevated and can telescope further up the scrutiny scaffolding under
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection.290
What is helpful about Romer for both sexual orientation antidiscrimination
and respect politics advancements is its factual and doctrinal context in
antidiscrimination against sexual orientation. With animus at its core, Kennedy’s
overturning of Colorado’s Amendment 2 is likely analogous to reasoning that
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See U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (“The federal statute is invalid,
for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those
whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity. By
seeking to displace this protection and treating those persons as living in marriages less
respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth Amendment. This
opinion and its holding are confined to those lawful marriages.”); see also Nancy C.
Marcus, Deeply Rooted Principles of Equal Liberty, Not “Argle Bargle”: The Inevitability
of Marriage Equality After Windsor, 23 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 17, 33 (2014) (“Although
the majority in Windsor failed to specify exactly which standard of scrutiny it was
applying, it can reasonably be concluded that it was at least applying the type of ‘more
searching form’ of scrutiny recognized by the district court in Windsor and by Justice
O’Connor in her Lawrence concurrence. While this higher level of scrutiny has not yet
been fully defined by the Court, it has been the subject of substantial attention and
speculation, with lower courts and other Supreme Court watchers often dubbing it ‘rational
basis with bite.’”).
290
See Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay
Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 871–72 (2014) (“United States v. Windsor was (at least in
part) an equal protection decision—about that, lower courts are in agreement. But when it
comes to the formal doctrinal aspects of the holding that is where the agreement ends.
Some courts have concluded that the Windsor Court applied heightened scrutiny; others
have found that it applied intermediate scrutiny. Still others have determined that the Court
applied rational basis review—or perhaps the ‘more searching form of rational basis
review’ known colloquially as rational basis with bite.”).
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would overturn the anti-LGBTQ state legislations.291 Windsor, another case about
discriminatory legislation, strengthens that animus concept and adds dignity to the
dialogue—despite its respectability politics and marriage context. Thus, because of
its respectability connotations, Windsor tempers Romer. Yet still, in the conflict
over transgender bathroom bills and anti-LGBT state legislation, the strength of
equal protection jurisprudence extending from Romer and Windsor could prove
worthy.292
Much has been observed regarding the lack of advancement in scrutiny levels
for sexual orientation in Kennedy’s Obergefell decision.293 But the helpful remnant
from Obergefell is the further solidification of animus and dignity concepts as an
anti-stereotyping principle. With a continued focus on litigating the dignity
interests and rights of sexual minorities under equal protection claims, dignity
would be more easily recalibrated to a politics of respect where the focus falls
more naturally on violations against the inherent humanity of sexual minorities—
with their minority sexual orientation as proxy for humanity—rather than solely
and particularly on the cultural assimilation of same-sex couples and families. In
those opportunities to litigate, a recalibration of the anti-stereotyping properties of
the animus-dignity connection must occur in which dignity reflects respect and not
respectability.
From Romer, Windsor, and Obergefell, animus has been used to reveal the
politics of disrespect underneath the heterosexist disapproval inflicted flagrantly
upon gays but couched in moral terms. Animus has been used to address that
disrespect by noting that such disrespect for their humanity engenders laws that are
consequently discriminatory. The impact of animus and its discriminatory harms
are brought out even further when such harms are couched within dignity concepts
that can show that animus or disrespect serves to offend humanist interests that
also violate constitutional principles of liberty and equality. From Lawrence,
dignity emerged in gay rights as a way to speak about the inherent worth of sexual
minorities as it did in Casey about the individual personhood interests of women.
And by facilitating this conversation, dignity also points to what exactly needs to
291

Garrett Epps, North Carolina’s Bathroom Bill Is a Constitutional Monstrosity,
ATLANTIC (May 10, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/hb2-is-aconstitutional-monstrosity/482106/
[https://perma.cc/A8GX-Y6QM]
(“Romer’s
language—and the concept of ‘animus’—may hold the key to the cloudy future of HB2.”).
292
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See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Liberty or Equality?, 2015 Anthony M. Kennedy
Lecture (Sep. 23, 2015), in 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 381, 396–97 (2016) (“[A]s a
practical matter an equal protection holding, concluding that sexual orientation is a suspect
classification, has a much broader scope than a liberty holding. Obergefell protects samesex marriage, but nothing else. An equality holding would protect LGBT individuals from
all discrimination by state actors including in employment, adoption rights, benefits, and so
forth.”); Nicolas, supra note 246, at 140 (noting that despite “the Court’s need to proceed
with caution” on expanding its suspect and quasi-suspect classifications, “the lag period
with respect to sexual orientation is excessive compared to other historically disadvantaged
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be protected and preserved in individual rights jurisprudence: autonomy and
personhood—not respectability. Thus, respect should be reserved for an
individual’s sexuality as an extension of an inherent part of his or her identity or
personhood, and respect is the better choice in future cases. Accordingly, returning
to dignity as respect in the constitutional litigation of gay rights in equal protection
helps recover the antidiscrimination aspect of the gay rights movement in a more
appropriate light.
2. Respect and Suspect Classification Cases
If respect and dignity appear to be helpful and doctrinally potent for
antidiscrimination and equality when used in the context of describing the intrinsic
human worth of individuals, then future litigation ought to carry forth where
Obergefell did not venture: an assessment of sexual orientation in heightened
scrutiny. In doing so, opportunity exists to advance antidiscrimination dialogue
beyond respectability with arguments for perceiving dignity as respect within a
person’s sexual orientation.
Likely the most direct avenue for recalibrating sexual orientation
discrimination cases back to respect politics is litigation through identity, rather
through conduct that is expressive of identity. Post-Obergefell, this type of
litigation over sexual identity—rather than just the autonomy of sexual
minorities—ought to persist to ultimately advance the doctrine to further
antidiscrimination protections. Beyond the rationality cases discussed above, equal
protection litigants in future LGBTQ cases should articulate that orientation ought
to be recognized as a protectable trait, and that denying the creation of a new
protected class based on sexual identity would continue to demean and stoke
disrespect for sexual minorities. With that said, such litigants in future cases
should try to leverage up by articulating their cases within a politics of respect
when arguing that sexual orientation belongs either within suspect or quasi-suspect
classifications.
To date, from the set of factors that would allow a court to determine whether
a group-identified trait suits quasi-suspect or suspect classification,294 a very
contentious factor for sexual minorities to find favor in the balancing has been
immutability.295 Although not dispositive on its own, the immutability factor,
294

See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 135, 146 (2011) (“[A]lthough described in different ways, the basic factors for
determining suspect class status were in place by the early 1980s: (1) prejudice against a
discrete and insular minority; (2) history of discrimination against the group; (3) the ability
of the group to seek political redress (i.e., political powerlessness); (4) the immutability of
the group’s defining trait; and (5) the relevancy of that trait.”).
295
See Edward Stein, Plural Marriage, Group Marriage and Immutability in
Obergefell v. Hodges and Beyond, 84 UMKC L. REV. 871, 890–91 (2016) (observing that
most U.S. courts have not embraced immutability in favor of LGBT rights for three
reasons: “First, some courts have said sexual-orientation classifications are behaviorbased—in contrast to status-based—classifications, and argued behavior-based
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which determines in the LGBTQ context whether the trait of sexual orientation is
innate and unchangeable for the purposes equal protection, has often been relevant
in the overall analysis.296 In addition, the change in ways courts have recently
defined immutability has become more favorable for sexual minorities—so
favorable that another possibility that future equal protection cases can recalibrate
to dignity as respect might be through the use of immutability to articulate sexual
identity as an innate trait in cases that are prone to finding discrimination against
sexual minorities.297 Thus, quite possibly in the post-Obergefell era, the
opportunities in which courts find that sexual orientation substantially balances
toward this factor may also open up opportunities for relocating sexual identities
within a politics of respect.
Historically, to ask whether a trait was changeable in terms of nature or
nurture implied that courts would have defined immutability more so along the
lines of biological mutability.298 Cases in this vein often would explain
immutability of a trait by regarding it as an “accident of birth.”299 This phrase
connotes a sense of blamelessness in the individual embodying the trait and indeed
traits that have tipped favorably toward this factor and advanced to receive equal
protections were ones, in which, courts observed little personal and moral
culpability.300 Of course, inquiries in this way rarely bode well for sexual
minorities. Under this original rubric, the debate over the immutability of a
classifications cannot be immutable. Second, courts have said sexual orientations are not
immutable because some people can change, choose, or hide their sexual orientations.
Third, courts have said it is simply not yet known whether sexual orientations are
immutable, and have thereby resisted the immutability argument’s conclusion.”).
296
See Edward Stein, Immutability and Innateness Arguments about Lesbian, Gay,
and Bisexual Rights, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 597, 629 (2014) [hereinafter Stein,
Immutability] (“Although the Supreme Court has rarely mentioned immutability since
Cleburne, lower federal courts and state supreme courts have continued to talk about
immutability in the context of laws related to sexual orientation.”).
297
Tiffany C. Graham, The Shifting Doctrinal Face of Immutability, 19 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 169, 202 (2011) (noting that the nuanced uses of immutability in more recent
pro-gay same-sex marriage cases in California, Connecticut, and Iowa high courts
“convey[] a message of respect to individuals by evaluating the claims of personhood that
they present to courts” and that “especially in the context of gay rights, the autonomy
model [of immutability] acknowledges the link between act and identity, offers respect for
individuals whose identities have been the source of persecution, and protects those same
individuals against unwarranted intrusion from the state”).
298
Strauss, supra note 294, at 162 (“Initially, courts considered immutability
something that a person is born with, a trait biologically determined . . . .”).
299
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
300
Id. at 686 (“[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special
disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate
‘the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility . . . .’” (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164,
175 (1972))).
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person’s sexual orientation usually tipped in favor of mutability, as homosexuality
was considered morally blameworthy or biologically aberrant but curable.301 The
inconclusiveness of scientific research on homosexuality was used to funnel
inquiry into rigid nature-or-nurture binaries, and thus sexual minorities found it
difficult to fulfill this factor.302 Indeed, nature or nurture, biology or choice, the
dilemma over immutability has been an issue that has plagued the finding of sexual
orientation as a protected trait for heightened scrutiny. Perhaps it was the
mischaracterization of homosexuality as an immoral lifestyle (which means one
can choose to be gay) or pathology (which means one could be cured of being gay)
that made it hard to see sexual orientation as an immutable trait. Also, the early
social representations of gays and lesbians, imbued with disrespect, likely
contributed to further reluctance on judging the trait of orientation sufficiently
immutable.303 In any event, for sexual minorities, immutability was one of the
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See, e.g., Susan R. Schmeiser, Changing the Immutable, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1495,
1502 (2009) (discussing the morally blameworthy argument of homosexuality:
“Conservative opponents of LGBT rights tend to argue that homosexuality is nothing more
nor less than a series of behavioral choices: choices to sin, to indulge, to flout the moral
strictures essential to a stable and virtuous life, to elevate hedonistic interests over altruistic
ones.” (citation omitted)); see also Stein, Immutability, supra note 296, at 625–26
(describing previous accounts that viewed homosexuality as an illness: “Until recently,
most people viewed homosexuality as a disease. Although some people, among them some
doctors and psychiatrists, still see homosexuality as a mental illness, there has been a
significant shift away from this view. One indication of this shift was the American
Psychiatric Association’s 1973 decision to declassify homosexuality as a mental disorder.
The effects of the shift from viewing homosexuality as a disease have been dramatic: some
of the stigma associated with homosexuality has lifted and more LGB people have become
comfortable and open about their sexual orientation. However, the ‘born that way’
argument, by emphasizing strong biological bases for homosexuality, represents a return of
sorts to a disease model of homosexuality. Further, the mere availability and use of
orientation-selection procedures could suggest that screening for homosexuality is a
reasonable and sanctioned medical procedure. This too could contribute towards a return to
seeing homosexuality as a physical or mental disorder.”).
302
See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573
(9th Cir. 1990) (“Homosexuality is not an immutable characteristic; it is behavioral and
hence is fundamentally different from traits such as race, gender, or alienage, which define
already existing suspect and quasi-suspect classes.” (citing accord Woodward v. United
States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Homosexuality, as a definitive trait, differs
fundamentally from those defining any of the recognized suspect or quasi-suspect classes.
Members of recognized suspect or quasi-suspect classes, e.g., blacks or women, exhibit
immutable characteristics, whereas homosexuality is primarily behavioral in
nature. . . . The conduct or behavior of the members of a recognized suspect or quasisuspect class has no relevance to the identification of those groups.”))).
303
See Graham, supra note 297, at 184–95 (discussing that the reasons why “early
decisions from the 1980s and onward disagreed with the proposition that homosexuals
were a suspect class, often on the ground that the immutability factor could not be
established” and observing that the three reasons involved perceptions of homosexuality,
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hardest factors to substantiate in favor of finding protected class status, and
therefore, any elevation for heightened protections under equality jurisprudence for
sexual minorities was stalled.
Over the years, however, out of a growing trend of cases, a reinterpretation of
the immutability factor has occurred where its definition honed in on a trait’s
significance in terms of its relationship to one’s personhood so much so that one
should not be coerced into changing or abridging the trait, rather than upon a
degree of biological changeability.304 The way in which courts would determine
whether this factor weighed in favor of a protected class finding would be to render
how “immutable” a trait was by weighing out the trait’s fundamental nature in the
face of interferences with some sort of coerced conformity that would change that
trait. Hence, the immutability of the trait—or the efficacy of coercing mutability
upon the trait in an individual, if that trait were sufficiently integral—became a
means for finding the fundamental importance of the trait, and not an end to itself
for describing the biology of it.305 From that aspect, it is possible to see that this
meaning of immutability carved out by these particular courts “is sensitive to the
importance of self-concept and embraces the idea that certain characteristics are
core to an individual’s sense of self and thus must be deemed unalterable.”306
Consequently, the idea of immutability or innateness is expanding.
The contentious history behind determining the immutability of sexual
orientation itself has a start in the politics of disrespect.307 But post-Lawrence, and
when marriage began to acquire more traction after Goodridge, that history started
to shift in the redefinition of immutability frequently in marriage equality cases at
state levels in the few years before Windsor, all the way up to Obergefell. For
instance, in 2008, the California Supreme Court, in part, took note of the Ninth
Circuit’s use of this “newer” or “minority” definition of immutability in its suspect
classification of sexual orientation in In re Marriage Cases:308 “Because a person’s
first as a condition that lacked scientific data of biological origin or permanence; secondly,
as an identity as a matter of choice; and third, as conduct as a matter of choice).
304
Strauss, supra note 294, at 162.
305
See Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility
Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 494 (1998)
(describing this type of immutability as “‘personhood immutability,’ in which the bearer’s
ability to change the trait is irrelevant, as long as it is central to her identity.” (citing
Watkins v. U.S. Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1446 (9th Cir. 1988))).
306
Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination
Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483, 1513 (2011).
307
See Arthur S. Leonard, Exorcizing the Ghosts of Bowers v. Hardwick: Uprooting
Invalid Precedents, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 519, 526 (2009) (“Lower federal courts quickly
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sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of one’s identity, it is not appropriate to
require a person to repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation in order to
avoid discriminatory treatment.”309 Shortly afterward, the state supreme courts in
Connecticut and Iowa respectively found the same in their pro-gay marriage
cases.310
Yet at this point, there is little complete guidance in the federal courts
regarding this factor’s current incarnation in constitutional case law after
Obergefell. Additionally, there are both critics skeptical toward this newer, less
formulaic definition from its seemingly empirical older variant and champions of
this redefinition.311 In a promising way, the newer definition’s appearance and
application for finding sexual orientation as a suspect class in one of the lower
federal court marriage decisions in the Sixth Circuit—a case that eventually
consolidated with others to become Obergefell—does reveal some continuing
dependence on immutability as part of the four-factor test for protected traits in
recent equality jurisprudence. In Obergefell v. Wymyslo,312 the federal district court
in Ohio was quick to use the less formulaic, more holistic approach: “To the extent
that ‘immutability’ is relevant to the inquiry of whether to apply heightened
scrutiny, the question is not whether a characteristic is strictly unchangeable, but
whether the characteristic is a core trait or condition that one cannot or should not
be required to abandon.”313 From there, despite “now broad medical and scientific
consensus that sexual orientation is immutable,”314 the Wymyslo court intimated its
appeal for the less formulaic, less empirical definition and stated that “[e]ven more
importantly, sexual orientation is so fundamental to a person’s identity that one
ought not be forced to choose between one’s sexual orientation and one’s rights as
an individual—even if such a choice could be made.”315 As support, the Wymyslo
court cited to Lawrence and its underlying endorsement of individual autonomy in
the Supreme Court’s holding to reveal how it interpreted the importance of this
less rigid definition of immutability.316 Other federal marriage cases leading up to
309
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Obergefell that adopted the same meaning of immutability have also cited to
Lawrence in similar a vein.317 Of course, as discussed in Part III, Lawrence is
particularly important for respect politics as it grounded its decision to
decriminalize consensual same-sex intimacy with discussions of dignity and
respect for sexual minorities.
Essentially the way in which Wymyslo and other federal cases have aligned
this definition of immutability with Lawrence’s regards for autonomy and
personhood in adopting it to find that sexual orientation is a protected trait for
heightened scrutiny is a start toward exhibiting some degree of accord with the
politics of respect. Between respect and respectability, this second and more recent
definition of immutability seems to favor respect because of these doctrinal
connections to individual freedoms and identity. It shifts its balancing toward
inherent identity rather than negotiation. Also, there is a negative rights quality
associated with liberty embedded here in the analysis of whether a protectable trait
is free from interference, almost in a way that creates a “right to be who you are”
underscored by principles of inherent autonomy that the factor recognizes.318 Thus,
it seems to embody both anti-humiliation and anti-subordination principles that
Yoshino has found elsewhere in gay rights cases. In addition, the signature of this
definition of immutability is compatible with the animus-dignity narrative of
sexual orientation discrimination that has been used in gay rights cases to show
how governmental interference on the basis of sexual orientation has led to
discrimination that demeans the individual.319 Indeed the contours of the definition
have anti-stereotyping potential and pairing it with the animus-dignity connection
would underscore the relevance and appropriateness of this newer immutability
definition over the older one. Both animus and dignity concepts appear in this
definition.
many other countries. There has been no showing that in this country the governmental
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317
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Animus appears because it can motivate acts of discrimination that targets an
individual based on a certain characteristic nature and interferes with the
individual’s autonomy.320 Likewise, dignity appears because the harm that results
from such animus-motived discrimination includes dignitary ones.321 As the newer
immutability definition was applied to sexual orientation, the way in which
Wymyslo cited to Lawrence harnesses dignity as respect rather than dignity as
respectability. Importing this association between the animus-dignity connection
and Lawrence’s dignity as respect into the newer immutability definition fortifies
the definition with respect politics-inquiry. Consequently, arguing for quasisuspect or suspect classification using this redefined immutability factor would
offer a new direction to move future gay rights antidiscrimination claims from
respectability to respect.
Obergefell ultimately did not weigh in on the immutability factor in terms of
equality jurisprudence because Kennedy’s fundamental rights analysis for marriage
equality essentially bypassed the need for an equal protection analysis that would
have specifically dealt with orientation and suspect classification.322 Kennedy did,
however, mention immutability of the sexual identities of the litigants as a
contingency for why they should have the right to marriage.323 His mentioning is
curious in that it textually assumes immutability without heavy doctrinal
investigation and analysis, and at the same time, he supports this passage by citing
to the amicus brief in support of the Obergefell plaintiffs filed by the American
Psychiatric Association (“APA”).324 In his description of sexual orientation,
Kennedy concurs with the APA that sexual orientation has both natural and
expressive components, but also at the same time, he emphasizes its immutability
or innateness.325 As Mary Ziegler has noted, this description “highlights that
sexuality is constitutive of individual identity.”326 Without being formally
scientific, and yet citing to the APA, Kennedy could be seen as towing a careful
middle line introducing the idea to the Court that sexual identity is immutable for
the purposes of allowing marriage rights, at the same time setting up the stage for
320
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future debates by aligning with Wymyslo and other pro-gay marriage cases that
explicitly concluded that sexual orientation was immutable for suspect or quasisuspect classification.
No doubt, this mentioning could be Kennedy’s own helpful leveraging. Some
commentators have quickly concluded that the immutability factor for sexual
orientation has been resolved as a result.327 Arguably this conclusion could stand,
but unless the Supreme Court’s more recent reluctance in tiered scrutiny is truly set
in stone and we have wholly abandoned protectable traits in equality
jurisprudence—which was not indicated in Obergefell—the leverage is great and
profound, but not quite as far-reaching. The immutability of sexual orientation will
have to be revisited in future LGBTQ cases.
If animus and dignity concepts are more frequently paired together with the
newer interpretation of immutability, then this arrangement would be another area
in equality jurisprudence where dignity could be recalibrated as respect rather than
respectability. Dignity as respect could place this definition of immutability within
the overtones of respect, imported from Lawrence, as litigants cast sexual
orientation under a broader immutability theory. Incidentally, it would also not be
inconsistent with Obergefell’s passing mention of immutability; in fact, it could
further augment Kennedy’s definition in the opinion when he incidentally
mentioned that the “immutable nature” of same-sex couples mandated the
extension of the right to marriage328 or that “sexual orientation is both a normal
expression of human sexuality and immutable.”329 Along that vein, the associations
of dignity as respect within the immutability discussion could reify respect politics
and at the same time make the case for the immutability of sexual orientation to
help gain ground eventually for heightened scrutiny. Immutability, above other
factors, has been one factor that has very often prevented a finding of suspect
classification for sexual minorities.330 In other words, what dignity as respect
would admit—and reveal what this Article has tried to demonstrate with respect
rhetoric—is that sexual identity is an innate part of human existence and ought to
be respected from discriminatory harm. From here, that mediating effect in animus
and dignity concepts recalibrated toward respect is favorable; it could potentially
broaden the immutability factor for building up a suspect or quasi-suspect
classification for sexual orientation under equal protection.
And such classification doctrinally mends that gap between Obergefell and
antidiscrimination advances for sexual orientation. In this method, pairing dignity
as respect with immutability still advances antidiscrimination as it clarifies
327
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immutability but also aligns it with antidiscrimination politics. If equal protection
finally recognizes sexual orientation under a protected classification, not only does
it enhance protections for sexual minorities under the Fourteenth Amendment, but
it presents the persuasive leveraging opportunities for antidiscrimination outside
the judiciary; such recognition also presses for majoritarian clarification for
protection under legislation, such as Title VII—particularly as, after marriage
equality, sexual minorities are left in an odd “paradoxical legal landscape in which
a person can be married on a Saturday and then fired on Monday for just that
act.”331 Antidiscrimination laws have tendencies to protect immutable traits.332 The
purpose of the immutability factor is to help clarify that the trait in question is one
in which discrimination has targeted and should not continue to be targeted.333
Therefore, pairing the newer definition of immutability with a recalibrated animusdignity connection that reflects respect politics could convince courts of the
adoption of the newer immutability definition and in turn obtain heightened
scrutiny for gays. In the long run, such advances bode well for legislative
developments in antidiscrimination, as well as preserve a more effective use of
dignity as respect for intrinsic human worth. All of this supports dignity as a
respect as the normative view rather than dignity as respectability. Eventually, if
the courts begin to elevate protections for sexual minorities by respecting their
sexual identities, then there will be more pressure to do the same on the legislative
end. Hopefully, the legislatures will then more willingly follow suit.
V. CONCLUSION
Indeed, as this Article has shown, the movement in gay rights advocacy must
continue to push for stronger antidiscrimination protections during the postmarriage equality era. Sexual minorities have achieved significant successes of
late, but their cultural acceptance is enveloped within a politics of respectability
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that is incompatible with normative positions on dignity within American
constitutional law. Instead, that politics of respectability restricts the visibility of
sexual minorities and leaves them within a paradigm that supports a hierarchy of
norms and values antithetical, as we have seen here, to formal equality and
antidiscrimination. Progressing to the meat of things invariably means that we
must move quickly beyond soup.
To reverse the trend, dignity will have to be recalibrated to reflect inherent
respect toward sexual identities—in litigation and in ways in which we view
substantive rights and equality. Otherwise, minority sexual identities will continue
to be subordinated post-Obergefell; only this time in deceptively smaller but no
less discourteous ways. Consequently, rather than finding out what sexuality
means to the dominant culture and allowing the mainstream to define its approach
to sexual identity, dignity as respect helps us get closer to allowing sexual
minorities to have an equal footing. Respect, and not respectability, would better
facilitate the equality that would eventually get both law and society to find out
what dignity ought to mean to all of us.

